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India's Best Friend


Stradlater

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4 minutes ago, sandeep said:

This is flawed misinformation - India did a LOT to support Tibet. And it was India's assistance to Tibet that was one of the major reasons China attacked us in 1962.  In the late 50s and 60s, India worked with the CIA to train a Tibetan army in exile.  Once India lost the border war to China, it had no choice but to eat humble pie and wind down its support to the Tibetans.  

 

I do not agree with the bolded statement above. Let's not make such posts 

 

Sardar Patel's letter written in 1950 - http://www.friendsoftibet.org/main/sardar.html 

 

https://www.dailypioneer.com/columnists/edit/when-nehru-left-the-tibetans-to-their-fate.html 

 

 

 

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25 minutes ago, zen said:

I do not agree with the bolded statement above. Let's not make such posts 

 

Sardar Patel's letter written in 1950 - http://www.friendsoftibet.org/main/sardar.html 

 

https://www.dailypioneer.com/columnists/edit/when-nehru-left-the-tibetans-to-their-fate.html 

 

 

 

What more would you have wanted GoI to do?  We weren't even self-sufficient in food back then.  They went as far as directly supporting armed rebellion.  Next step would have been an actual military invasion of Tibet.  Its become a propaganda touchstone of Sanghis to blame Nehru for everything that went wrong back then.  Oh if only we had "helped" Tibet.  Like it was so easy.  Reality is a lot more nuanced than that.  Bottomline was that China was a lot more motivated and determined to annex Tibet.  There simply wasn't a lot more that could be done, short of signing up for the US side of the cold war.  And that's a whole another debate for another time.  

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16 minutes ago, sandeep said:

What more would you have wanted GoI to do?  We weren't even self-sufficient in food back then.  They went as far as directly supporting armed rebellion.  Next step would have been an actual military invasion of Tibet.  Its become a propaganda touchstone of Sanghis to blame Nehru for everything that went wrong back then.  Oh if only we had "helped" Tibet.  Like it was so easy.  Reality is a lot more nuanced than that.  Bottomline was that China was a lot more motivated and determined to annex Tibet.  There simply wasn't a lot more that could be done, short of signing up for the US side of the cold war.  And that's a whole another debate for another time.  

Ind did not want to do much as Nehru was probably was too busy in dealing with important matters in Korea and driving India-China brotherhood:

 

Quote

 

https://cmvtcivils.wordpress.com/2015/09/08/indias-role-in-korean-war/ 

 

  • Nehru was afraid that Korean war would lead to WW3 and that atomic bombs could be used(Soviet also developed ‘the bomb’), this might drag India in to the war. Also as China is its neighbor, it was afraid of the spill over effects.
  • India tried to pacify all sides by mediating the matter between all parties.
  • Apparently, The New York Times declared that the struggle for Asia “could be won or lost in the mind of one man – Jawaharlal Nehru”.
  • India instead of sending its armed forces on the request of UN had sent a medical unit to Korea as a humanitarian gesture, India’s medical services are still fondly remembered in Korea by both sides
  • India was the chairman of the Neutral Nations Repatriation Commission which would handle the prisoners of war(PoWs) of both sides and interview them to determine which of them wanted to go back.
  • India dispatched a 6000 Indian Custodial Force to Korea.
  • At the end of the war, India did not gain much and received flak from all sides. Relationship with US deteriorated(for not siding with it) and US began giving military-aid to Pakistan.
  • On the other hand, the war elevated Nehru’s prestige to great heights in the world, solidifying his image as world’s leading statesman. For the rest of his life, there was no major global discussion in the world, which could occur without his involvement.

 

 

 

 

Quote

 

In the year 1950, two momentous events shook Asia and the world. One was the Chinese invasion of Tibet, and the other, the Chinese intervention in the Korean War. The first was near, on India’s borders, the other, far away in the Korean Peninsula where India had little at stake. By all canons of logic, India should have devoted utmost attention to the immediate situation in Tibet, and let interested parties like China and the U.S. sort it out in Korea.

But Jawaharlal Nehru, India’s Prime Minister did exactly the opposite. He treated the Tibetan crisis in a haphazard fashion, while getting heavily involved in Korea. India today is paying for this folly by being the only country of its size in the world without an official boundary with its giant neighbor. Tibet soon disappeared from the map. As in Kashmir, Nehru sacrificed national interest at home in pursuit of international glory abroad.

 

http://indiafacts.org/nehru-and-the-china-tibet-blunder/ 

 

 

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41 minutes ago, sandeep said:

You keep throwing random excerpts from random blogs, but are still unable to spell out what could have been done differently?  

we would need to revisit history to see what options India had to see what Ind could have done differently:

 

Opportunity 1: 1949 Tibet broke off diplomatic relationship with China and made Chinese representative depart Lhasa 

  • This was a great opportunity for India to do a defence agreement with Tibet, which could have proactively stopped China's invasion 

 

At riskIf Tibet is a part of China, it could mean handing over Arunachal Pradesh (South Tibet) to China. The "McMohan line" border agreement was done with Tibet. China claims that the agreement is invalid as Tibet is a part of China and not authorized to carry out such negotiations

 

Opportunity 2: 1950 China announced its intention to march in to Tibet. During this timeframe, Dalai Lama reached out to various leaders including Nehru. When DL asked for advise, Nehru discouraged Tibet from going to UN because of what had happened with Kashmir and when both issues were not apples to apples (Kashmir agreed to join India, while Tibet did not agree to join China). India's ambassador to China turned a blind eye to the event. From the blog:

 

" Nehru’s main interest was to sponsor China as a member of the UN Security Council instead of safeguarding Indian interests in Tibet. Because of this, when the Chinese were moving troops into Tibet, there was little concern in Indian official circles. Panikkar, the Indian Ambassador in Beijing, went so far as to pretend that there was ‘lack of confirmation’ of the presence of Chinese troops in Tibet and that to protest the Chinese invasion of Tibet would be an “interference to India’s efforts on behalf of China in the UN”. 

 

So Panikkar was more interested in protecting Chinese interests in the UN than India’s own interests on the Tibetan border! Nehru agreed with his Ambassador. He wrote, “our primary consideration is maintenance of world peace… Recent developments in Korea have not strengthened China’s position, which will be further weakened by any aggressive action [by India] in Tibet.” So Nehru was ready to sacrifice India’s national security interests in Tibet so as not to weaken China’s case in the UN!" 

 

 How India has handled Tibet is a good case study on strategic blunders .... hope this helps!

 

 

PS  From Sardar's letter to Nehru - "  The tragedy of it is that the Tibetans put faith in us; they chose to be guided by us; and we have been unable to get them out of the meshes of Chinese diplomacy or Chinese malevolence. 

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24 minutes ago, zen said:

we would need to revisit history to see what options India had to see what Ind could have done differently:

 

Opportunity 1: 1949 Tibet broke off diplomatic relationship with China and made Chinese representative depart Lhasa 

  • This was a great opportunity for India to do a defence agreement with Tibet, which could have proactively stopped China's invasion 

 

At riskIf Tibet is a part of China, it could mean handing over Arunachal Pradesh (South Tibet) to China. The "McMohan line" border agreement was done with Tibet. China claims that the agreement is invalid as Tibet is a part of China and not authorized to carry out such negotiations

 

Opportunity 2: 1950 China announced its intention to march in to Tibet. During this timeframe, Dalai Lama reached out to various leaders including Nehru. When DL asked for advise, Nehru discouraged Tibet from going to UN because of what had happened with Kashmir and when both issues were not apples to apples (Kashmir agreed to join India, while Tibet did not agree to join China). India's ambassador to China turned a blind eye to the event. From the blog:

 

" Nehru’s main interest was to sponsor China as a member of the UN Security Council instead of safeguarding Indian interests in Tibet. Because of this, when the Chinese were moving troops into Tibet, there was little concern in Indian official circles. Panikkar, the Indian Ambassador in Beijing, went so far as to pretend that there was ‘lack of confirmation’ of the presence of Chinese troops in Tibet and that to protest the Chinese invasion of Tibet would be an “interference to India’s efforts on behalf of China in the UN”. 

 

So Panikkar was more interested in protecting Chinese interests in the UN than India’s own interests on the Tibetan border! Nehru agreed with his Ambassador. He wrote, “our primary consideration is maintenance of world peace… Recent developments in Korea have not strengthened China’s position, which will be further weakened by any aggressive action [by India] in Tibet.” So Nehru was ready to sacrifice India’s national security interests in Tibet so as not to weaken China’s case in the UN!" 

 

 How India has handled Tibet is a good case study on strategic blunders .... hope this helps!

 

 

PS  From Sardar's letter to Nehru - "  The tragedy of it is that the Tibetans put faith in us; they chose to be guided by us; and we have been unable to get them out of the meshes of Chinese diplomacy or Chinese malevolence. 

There's no question that Nehru committed massive blunders with respect to China.  At a minimum, the failure of India to be adequately prepared for 1962 is primarily on him.  But we are not talking about that here - we are talking about Tibet.  The battle-hardened CCP annexed Tibet in 1950.  India was in no position to militarily resist or intervene.  In hindsight, Nehru's tactic of supporting China in a quest for a peaceful allied relationship failed spectacularly.  The CCP regime at the time was highly paranoid and suspicious of all others, and acted with hostility towards India, which was sending schizophrenic mixed signals with regards to the disputed border.  

 

If India had made public noises about Tibet at the UN or elsewhere, do you really believe that it would have had material impact on the situation in Tibet?  Hardly.  CCP had a strong backer in the USSR - at least in the early 50s. It would have taken more than words to change the ground situation.  Material action.  Which India did not have the capacity, or the motivation for, in the 1950s.  And in spite of that, Tibetan resistance did receive assistance from India at some point - I don't recall of the top of my head the timeframe of the Mustang training setup etc.  But it was during that era wasn't it?  

 

I don't disagree with you that if one could go back in time, the India-China situation could have, and arguably should have, been handled much better. But realistically speaking, you have to recognize that in 1950, India was dealing with an idealogically motivated, battle-hardened foe who saw Tibet as vital to its security, whereas the most value Tibet had for India was a 'buffer' beyond the Himalayas.  Hindsight may make it easy to make bold claims, but the logic of not going overboard in responding to China's Tibet invasion made eminent sense.  And if Nehru's gamble had paid off in terms of getting the Chinese to be a friend instead of a foe, India would have been quite well-placed as well.  Some times things don't work out as planned, its easy to criticize after the fact, but you have got to have the capacity to be objective and analytical in your criticism.  

 

PS. I actually read the letter you linked before you threw that quote at me - and I have read it earlier as well.  The letter is a sterling example of what an awesome statesman India had in Sardar.  Too bad he died when he did.  

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50 minutes ago, sandeep said:

There's no question that Nehru committed massive blunders with respect to China.  At a minimum, the failure of India to be adequately prepared for 1962 is primarily on him.  But we are not talking about that here - we are talking about Tibet.  The battle-hardened CCP annexed Tibet in 1950.  India was in no position to militarily resist or intervene.  In hindsight, Nehru's tactic of supporting China in a quest for a peaceful allied relationship failed spectacularly.  The CCP regime at the time was highly paranoid and suspicious of all others, and acted with hostility towards India, which was sending schizophrenic mixed signals with regards to the disputed border.  

 

If India had made public noises about Tibet at the UN or elsewhere, do you really believe that it would have had material impact on the situation in Tibet?  Hardly.  CCP had a strong backer in the USSR - at least in the early 50s. It would have taken more than words to change the ground situation.  Material action.  Which India did not have the capacity, or the motivation for, in the 1950s.  And in spite of that, Tibetan resistance did receive assistance from India at some point - I don't recall of the top of my head the timeframe of the Mustang training setup etc.  But it was during that era wasn't it?  

 

I don't disagree with you that if one could go back in time, the India-China situation could have, and arguably should have, been handled much better. But realistically speaking, you have to recognize that in 1950, India was dealing with an idealogically motivated, battle-hardened foe who saw Tibet as vital to its security, whereas the most value Tibet had for India was a 'buffer' beyond the Himalayas.  Hindsight may make it easy to make bold claims, but the logic of not going overboard in responding to China's Tibet invasion made eminent sense. 

In my last post, I stated the below from the blog:

 

So Panikkar was more interested in protecting Chinese interests in the UN than India’s own interests on the Tibetan border! Nehru agreed with his Ambassador. He wrote, “our primary consideration is maintenance of world peace… Recent developments in Korea have not strengthened China’s position, which will be further weakened by any aggressive action [by India] in Tibet.” So Nehru was ready to sacrifice India’s national security interests in Tibet so as not to weaken China’s case in the UN!" 

 

So taking some sort of aggressive action was an option for India

 

Additionally proactive diplomatic initiatives could have resulted in China not marching in to Tibet in the first place. India needed to make a serious effort on this front esp considering the "risks" outlined in my previous post .... Russia initiatives had helped Mongolia to remain independent (highlighting the value of working to have buffer states)

 

 

Quote

And if Nehru's gamble had paid off in terms of getting the Chinese to be a friend instead of a foe, India would have been quite well-placed as well.  Some times things don't work out as planned, its easy to criticize after the fact, but you have got to have the capacity to be objective and analytical in your criticism. 

 When we use words such as gamble, it highlights that Ind took a risk by pursuing that policy in Tibet. And when Sardar's letter clearly warns India, indicating that there was a line of thinking within India's leadership circles that explored different options 

 

PS a good read below:

 

https://www.dailypioneer.com/columnists/edit/when-nehru-left-the-tibetans-to-their-fate.html 

 

Developments have shown just how wrong Jawaharlal Nehru had been in handling the China-Tibet policy, not just ignoring the advice of a capable IFS officer but also brushing aside Sardar Patel’s warnings

 

When China walked into Eastern Tibet on October 7, 1950, the Tibetan Army could offer only a minimum resistance. During the following week, the Indian Government started to cautiously react to the invasion of its neighbour; Delhi wanted to be sure not to ‘upset’ communist China.

 

It is in these circumstances that a young Chinese-speaking IFS officer, Sumul Sinha, took over as the Head of the Indian Mission in Lhasa. Sinha was heading for tough times: India’s Tibet policy was in the process of changing radically under the impulsion of KM Panikkar, India’s Ambassador in China, suddenly promoted to being Jawaharlal Nehru’s chief advisor for Tibet affairs. To make things worse, Sardar Vallabhbhai Patel, the Deputy Prime Minister, would pass away in December.

 

On November 17, at the age of 15, the Dalai Lama had to assume temporal power over the Land of Snows; the same day, Delhi sent a cable to the Political Officer in Sikkim: “If danger to Mission develops, all Top Secret papers and other secret papers should be destroyed by burning.” A wind of panic had stared blowing over the Indian capital.

 

It is in these circumstances that the relationship between the new Indian Representative in Lhasa and the Prime Minister started souring. On November 23, Nehru, who also held the Foreign Minister’s portfolio, cabled Sinha: “Government of India have noticed that certain communications from Lhasa and Sikkim regarding Tibet are dogmatic, disputatious and admonitory… Once a decision has been taken by Government [to abandon Tibet to its fate], it should be accepted gracefully and followed faithfully; any insinuation that Government have been acting wrongly or improperly is objectionable.”

 

Sinha’s reports did not fit into Nehru’s global vision of the world — the ‘larger vision’, as he used to call it. Sinha had expressed too much sympathy for the Tibetan people, at a time when their nation was being erased. The cable from Delhi continues in the same vein: “While local officers may be experts in their field, they CANNOT be fully aware of the wide considerations involved and the repercussions of a particular course of action.” This invective returned again and again in Nehru’s dealings with sincere and competent officers (whether in the civil services or the Army); particularly those who tried to warn him of the consequences of his ‘friendship at any cost’ policy with China.

 

The famous ‘larger vision’ was then expounded: “India’s policy is primarily based on avoidance of war and maintenance of peace, as we consider world war most terrible of calamities for humanity.” On the altar of this new ‘political’ dogma, Tibet was sacrificed, as were India’s national interests in this affair.

 

Nehru’s reaction against Sinha has to be seen with the background of Sardar Patel’s prophetic letter to Nehru written early November: “The Chinese Government has tried to delude us by professions of peaceful intention… at a crucial period they manage to instill into our Ambassador a false sense of confidence in their so-called desire to settle the Tibetan problem by peaceful means. There can be no doubt that during the period covered by this correspondence the Chinese must have been concentrating for an onslaught on Tibet. The final action of the Chinese... is little short of perfidy.”

 

Nehru could not admonish Patel the way he did Sinha, so he chose to ignore the letter while changing India’s Tibet policy. Nehru gives Sinha the crux of his new credo: “Emergency of strong centralised Government of China, with a revolutionary urge, has been most significant fact of present generation. This affects India more particularly and future of Asia depends upon relationship of India with China.”

 

Twelve years later, the same China humiliated India on the slopes of the Thagla ridge, but, in the meantime, Sinha, the young IFS officer was blamed for not being able to grasp India’s novel policy. The cable continues to eulogise China’s revolution: “For this reason we tried to cultivate friendly relations with China and we believe that this became a stabilising factor when Korean war started.” The Korean war and the role ‘India’ (read Nehru) was eager to play as a peace-maker, would become the pretext to let down Tibet and sell-out India’s borders.

 

Two years later, soon before the end of his tenure in Lhasa, Sinha upset the Prime Minister again. Sinha got the bad idea to ask for a loan of two lakh rupees to help the forces fighting for Tibetan independence! Nehru was furious. In a cable sent to the Mission in Lhasa, the Prime Minister tells off Sinha; it would be “improper and unwise for our representative to get involved in Tibetan domestic affairs or intrigues”.

 

Sumul Sinha left Lhasa in September 1952 and was replaced by his Foreign Service colleague AK Sen, but his problems with the pacifist Prime Minister were far from being over. On March 5, 1953, Nehru dictated a note in a reply to a memo prepared by Sinha, now an Officer on Special Duty in the External Affairs Ministry. The title of Sinha’s note was, ‘Chinese designs on the North-East Frontier of India’.

 

The Prime Minister was mad at Sinha for having dared speak about Chinese ‘designs: “I find Mr Sinha’s approach to be coloured very much by certain ideas and conceptions which prevent him from taking an objective view of the situation. The note starts by reference to the lust for conquest of the Chinese and is throughout based on this.”

 

Only six years later, when the Chinese attacked the Longju Post in Subansiri Frontier Division, Nehru began to appreciate the meaning of Sinha’s analysis. By that time, it was already too late; further, India reacted by designing an ill-conceived ‘Forward Policy’ which eventually triggered a War. But in 1953, Nehru believed ‘communist China is our friend; it will never attack us’.

 

Sinha’s note, even if rejected due its ‘tone’, forced the Government to think about the policy to be pursued to take care of India’s borders. Unfortunately, no action followed for years. Sinha’s problem was that he was not a ‘darbari’, writing only what his master wanted to hear. He had also warned Nehru that the Chinese could infiltrate Nepal through communist sympathisers (how true it was!). Nehru had answered: “There is danger in Nepal, but this too is due to internal chaotic conditions than to outside interference. As a matter of fact, the outside interference that is troubling us is American and not Chinese.”

 

Nehru concluded: “It appears that Mr Sinha does not appreciate our policy fully. He should be enlightened.” Thereafter, the officer was a dejected man. History has proved Nehru wrong and Sumul Sinha prophetically right. A posthumous justice?

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3 hours ago, zen said:

Additionally proactive diplomatic initiatives could have resulted in China not marching in to Tibet in the first place. India needed to make a serious effort on this front esp considering the "risks" outlined in my previous post .... Russia initiatives had helped Mongolia to remain independent (highlighting the value of working to have buffer states)

 

Diplomatic initiatives would have gone nowhere.  And please don't compare India that was independent for a handful of years to Russia, which possessed a massive war machine that had just beaten Nazi Germany.  

 

Bottomline, realistically speaking India had few, if any concrete options when it came to responding to China's invasion of Tibet.  It had a weak hand, and even if Nehru had died and Sardar was leading India, not much could have been done about Tibet at that point. Aksai Chin? Probably a different case.  But Tibet was a gone case.  A done deal.  Regardless of Nehru's actions, motives or intent.

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58 minutes ago, sandeep said:

Diplomatic initiatives would have gone nowhere.  And please don't compare India that was independent for a handful of years to Russia, which possessed a massive war machine that had just beaten Nazi Germany.  

 

Bottomline, realistically speaking India had few, if any concrete options when it came to responding to China's invasion of Tibet.  It had a weak hand, and even if Nehru had died and Sardar was leading India, not much could have been done about Tibet at that point. Aksai Chin? Probably a different case.  But Tibet was a gone case.  A done deal.  Regardless of Nehru's actions, motives or intent.

I do not agree. We are repeating ourselves. If Ind supported Tibet (including acting proactively rather than haphazardly), China could have been forced to evaluate other options including finding a way through negotiations as Nehru identified "Recent developments in Korea have not strengthened China’s position, which will be further weakened by any aggressive action [by India] in Tibet."

 

Anyways, you are entitled to your opinion - a country such as India could not do much, risking the McMohan line. Today, If China attacks AP claiming it to be a part of Tibet, you could say similar things i.e. Ind cannot do anything  :dontknow:

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2 hours ago, zen said:

I do not agree. We are repeating ourselves. If Ind supported Tibet (including acting proactively rather than haphazardly), China could have been forced to evaluate other options including finding a way through negotiations as Nehru identified "Recent developments in Korea have not strengthened China’s position, which will be further weakened by any aggressive action [by India] in Tibet."

 

Anyways, you are entitled to your opinion - a country such as India could not do much, risking the McMohan line. Today, If China attacks AP claiming it to be a part of Tibet, you could say similar things i.e. Ind cannot do anything  :dontknow:

I'm not the one repeatedly posting isolated quotes from a rando blog, or making nonsensical claims that India could have "acted proactively" - what specifically could India have done differently in 1950 when the battle-hardened People's Liberation Army took over Tibet?  What hard options did GoI have, other than blowing pompous hot air in UN conference rooms?  Mao and his soldiers cared eff-all about what the world thought of them.  You need to read up on some history of that era to realize just how isolated and intentionally cut-off from the rest of the world China and the CCP was. CCP gave zero *s what UN or rest of the world thought or said.  

 

Short of war, there was no other way to dissaude the CCP from swallowing Tibets as they already had.  And India did not have the means or the motivation to go to war then - heck even in 1965 India had to settle for a ceasefire instead of pressing the advantage because we had run out of ammunition.  1950 mein kyaa ukhaad lena tha?  

 

So bottomline - your claim that India should have handled Tibet differently is dubious hindsight, and grossly overlooks the cost-benefit equations that were prevalent at the time.  

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2 hours ago, zen said:

I do not agree. We are repeating ourselves. If Ind supported Tibet (including acting proactively rather than haphazardly), China could have been forced to evaluate other options including finding a way through negotiations as Nehru identified "Recent developments in Korea have not strengthened China’s position, which will be further weakened by any aggressive action [by India] in Tibet."

 

Anyways, you are entitled to your opinion - a country such as India could not do much, risking the McMohan line. Today, If China attacks AP claiming it to be a part of Tibet, you could say similar things i.e. Ind cannot do anything  :dontknow:

this is more or less nonsense, since India had no logistical capacity to send an army to encamp in Lhasa for the winter, nevermind another 700kms to the Sino-Tibetan border. 

 

Only a fool makes threats it is not prepared to/capable of carrying out.  3 years after independence, with a starving populace, zero capacity to cross the himalayas, we could've stopped PLA from walking into Tibet....send me some of the dope you are smoking, because its bloody good.

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37 minutes ago, sandeep said:

I'm not the one repeatedly posting isolated quotes from a rando blog, or making nonsensical claims that India could have "acted proactively" - what specifically could India have done differently in 1950 when the battle-hardened People's Liberation Army took over Tibet?  What hard options did GoI have, other than blowing pompous hot air in UN conference rooms?  Mao and his soldiers cared eff-all about what the world thought of them.  You need to read up on some history of that era to realize just how isolated and intentionally cut-off from the rest of the world China and the CCP was. CCP gave zero *s what UN or rest of the world thought or said.  

 

Short of war, there was no other way to dissaude the CCP from swallowing Tibets as they already had.  And India did not have the means or the motivation to go to war then - heck even in 1965 India had to settle for a ceasefire instead of pressing the advantage because we had run out of ammunition.  1950 mein kyaa ukhaad lena tha?  

 

So bottomline - your claim that India should have handled Tibet differently is dubious hindsight, and grossly overlooks the cost-benefit equations that were prevalent at the time. 

You can keep on repeating that but it is not convincing as If battles/wars are won based on strength on paper alone, Ind would be in Chinese occupation now based on what you described of Ind’s situation in 1960s, which probably everyone here is aware of (so no need to post like it is some kind of news :wink: )

 

Already mentioned a couple of options in one of my posts. Talked about proactive measures too, which Nehru deliberately ignored despite inputs from men in the field. And on top of that tried to advance China’s cause (as discussed in earlier posts), shamefully, leaving Tibet, who trusted India, to the wolves (as Nehru described it as leaving Tibet to its fate)

 

Your point is like saying  “oh the exam paper was very hard so it is ok that I did not study for it. As even if I had studied, I would have failed. So there is no point in blaming me for not studying” :facepalm: .... efforts to safeguard interests of the nation and its friends have to be made 

 

PS btw those blogs are written by people knowledgeable about the issue. The statements from them provide insights if people know how to harness them 

 

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4 minutes ago, zen said:

You can keep on repeating that but it is not convincing as If battles/wars are won based on strength on paper alone, Ind would be in Chinese occupation now based on what you described of Ind situation in 1960s, which probably everyone here is aware of (so no need to post like it is some kind of news :wink: )

 

Already mentioned a couple of options in one of my posts. Talked about proactive measures too, which Nehru deliberately ignored despite inputs from men in the field. And on top of that tried to advance China’s cause, shamefully, leaving Tibet, who trusted India, to the wolves

 

Like a pigeon, you are free to shut your eyes and imagine the situation that you prefer (may be to fr good about Nehru). Your point is like saying  “oh the paper was very hard so it is ok that I did not study for it. As even if I had studied, I would have failed. So there is no point in blaming me for not studying” :facepalm:

You keep parroting the "proactive measures" line.  Let's take a hypothetical scenario.  Its 1950.  Sardar Vallabhbhai "Zen" Patel is PM of India - Nehru is dead.  PLA has invaded and annexed Tibet.  What "proactive measures" will you take?  

 

Its one thing to wish things turned out differently in history, its another to claim that it was realistically possible to do so.  Like a Pigeon, you are free to shut your eyes and believe in the delusion that if not for Nehru, the India-Tibet-China equation would have played out differently.  Given the facts of the matter, its not likely.  Please feel free to counter with something a bit more serious than silly exam-paper analogies.  

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34 minutes ago, sandeep said:

You keep parroting the "proactive measures" line.  Let's take a hypothetical scenario.  Its 1950.  Sardar Vallabhbhai "Zen" Patel is PM of India - Nehru is dead.  PLA has invaded and annexed Tibet.  What "proactive measures" will you take?  

 

Its one thing to wish things turned out differently in history, its another to claim that it was realistically possible to do so.  Like a Pigeon, you are free to shut your eyes and believe in the delusion that if not for Nehru, the India-Tibet-China equation would have played out differently.  Given the facts of the matter, its not likely.  Please feel free to counter with something a bit more serious than silly exam-paper analogies.  

If we are talking about proactive measures, why do we even have to wait till 1950? As aforementioned: 

 

8 hours ago, zen said:

 

Opportunity 1: 1949 Tibet broke off diplomatic relationship with China and made Chinese representative depart Lhasa 

  • This was a great opportunity for India to do a defence agreement with Tibet, which could have proactively stopped China's invasion 

 

Marching in to Tibet with Ind army’s presence (even in small numbers) is a different military and diplomatic proposition to marching in to Tibet with just the Tibetan army (and less risk of other ramifications) .... China would have had to take the initiative to negotiate with Ind (and therefore potentially trigger international intervention).... Which is why the Hindi-Chini Bhai Bhai Nehru’s policy worked for China

Edited by zen
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1 minute ago, zen said:

If we are talking about proactive measures, why do we even have to wait till 1950? As aforementioned: 

 

 

Because agreement means jack $hit if it cannot be enforced. 

India lost 1963 because it did not have road and INFRASTRUCTURE to Tibet's border and INTO Tibet. 

China didn't have infrastructure in Tibet either, but China, unlike India, had it right up to Tibet and going into Tibet is a whole lot easier from China side than India side ( basic geography 101). 


What purile idocy fancies India's ability to uphold a defence pact WITH Tibet in 1950 ? 

In pre-ICBM, nuclear deterrent era, whatever this fantasical 'India-China theatre of war is in 1950 from India upholding treaty with Tibet and coming to its rescue' portion is, it DECISIVELY favors the Chinese. 


Again, warfare, pacts, etc are not just a rando spitballer's 'should've done something else' farts in the wind. Nobody who is to be taken seriously ever makes a threat it isnt willing to/capable of carrying out when it comes to war. 

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14 minutes ago, Muloghonto said:

Because agreement means jack $hit if it cannot be enforced. 

India lost 1963 because it did not have road and INFRASTRUCTURE to Tibet's border and INTO Tibet. 

China didn't have infrastructure in Tibet either, but China, unlike India, had it right up to Tibet and going into Tibet is a whole lot easier from China side than India side ( basic geography 101). 


What purile idocy fancies India's ability to uphold a defence pact WITH Tibet in 1950 ? 

In pre-ICBM, nuclear deterrent era, whatever this fantasical 'India-China theatre of war is in 1950 from India upholding treaty with Tibet and coming to its rescue' portion is, it DECISIVELY favors the Chinese. 


Again, warfare, pacts, etc are not just a rando spitballer's 'should've done something else' farts in the wind. Nobody who is to be taken seriously ever makes a threat it isnt willing to/capable of carrying out when it comes to war. 

Our friend here is living in a Sim-City style world where a "defense agreement" is sufficient to keep invading troops at bay.  That's not how the real world works.  Logistics, geography, etc matter more than wishful thinking.  

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50 minutes ago, sandeep said:

Our friend here is living in a Sim-City style world where a "defense agreement" is sufficient to keep invading troops at bay.  That's not how the real world works.  Logistics, geography, etc matter more than wishful thinking.  

That idiot is blocked by me .... back on topic:

 

Marching in to Tibet with Ind army’s presence (even in small numbers) is a different military and diplomatic proposition to marching in to Tibet with just the Tibetan army (less risk of other ramifications) .... China would have had to take the initiative to negotiate with Ind (and therefore potentially trigger international intervention).... Which is why the Hindi-Chini Bhai Bhai Nehru’s policy worked for China

 

Appears as if you did not get the scope and scale of the “defence agreement”. You assumed it to be some kind of treaty on paper only! 

 

Efforts to safeguard the nation and its friends have to be made. Or we end up trying to discover and discuss who Ind’s best friend is

 

Anyways, continue to hype up China to shield Nehru, whose Hindi-China Bhai Bhai dreams, the “gamble” that you described, were shattered soon

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4 minutes ago, zen said:

That idiot is blocked by me .... on topic 

 

Marching in to Tibet with Ind army’s presence (even in small numbers) is a different military and diplomatic proposition to marching in to Tibet with just the Tibetan army (and less risk of other ramifications) .... China would have had to take the initiative to negotiate with Ind (and therefore potentially trigger international intervention).... Which is why the Hindi-Chini Bhai Bhai Nehru’s policy worked for China

 

Appears as if you did not get the scope and scale of the “defence agreement”. You assumed it to be some kind of a treaty :wink: 

 

Anyways, continue to hype up China to shield Nehru 

Again, come out of your la-la land and realize that such an agreement as you think, was in India's ability to do. It wasn't. Only thing we had, was pen and paper, aka treaty.

China would march into Tibet 2 months after we sign that treaty and half of Tibet would be massacred till it surrendered and India too, surrendered after suffering a bloody nose against a mightier foe. 

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1 hour ago, sandeep said:

You keep parroting the "proactive measures" line.  Let's take a hypothetical scenario.  Its 1950.  Sardar Vallabhbhai "Zen" Patel is PM of India - Nehru is dead.  PLA has invaded and annexed Tibet.  What "proactive measures" will you take?  

 

Its one thing to wish things turned out differently in history, its another to claim that it was realistically possible to do so.  Like a Pigeon, you are free to shut your eyes and believe in the delusion that if not for Nehru, the India-Tibet-China equation would have played out differently.  Given the facts of the matter, its not likely.  Please feel free to counter with something a bit more serious than silly exam-paper analogies.  

Nehru allowed China to get onto UNSC to please the USSR. He approved of Plebiscite for J&K.  Munnabhai and Circuit were not the first practitioners of Gandhigiri. It was chachaji. Simply put, he was the 1950s version of current Canadian PM Justin Trudeau. Look after the whole frigging world first and your own country last. This statement defines every single major decision Nehru ever took. 

Edited by FischerTal
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6 hours ago, FischerTal said:

Nehru allowed China to get onto UNSC to please the USSR. He approved of Plebiscite for J&K.  Munnabhai and Circuit were not the first practitioners of Gandhigiri. It was chachaji. Simply put, he was the 1950s version of current Canadian PM Justin Trudeau. Look after the whole frigging world first and your own country last. This statement defines every single major decision Nehru ever took. 

I don't disagree with any of that. But irrespective of that, India's options in Tibet were severely constrained by geography and capacity. 

 

 

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