Aadhaar

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Aadhaar: on a platform of myths R. Ramakumar The Hindu, July 17th 2011

The Aadhaar project, just as its failed counterpart in the U.K., stands on a platform of myths. India needs a mass campaign to expose these myths. Two countries. Two pet projects of the respective Prime Ministers. Unmistakable parallels in the discourse. ŵhe case for ID cards is a case not about liberty, but about the modern world, wrote Tony Blair in November 2006, as he was mobilising support for his Identity Cards Bill, 2004. Å¢adhaar©Ês symbolic of the new and modern India, said Manmohan Singh in September 2010, as he distributed the first Aadhaar number in Nandurbar. Ÿhat we are trying to do with identity cards is make use of the modern technology, said Mr. Blair. Å¢adhaar project would use today's latest and modern technology, said Dr. Singh. The similarities are endless. Mr. Blair's celebrated push for identity cards ended in a political disaster for Labour. The British people resisted the project for over five years. Finally, the Cameron government scrapped the Identity Cards Act in 2010, thus abolishing identity cards and plans for a National Identity Register. On the other hand, India is enthusiastically pushing the Aadhaar, or unique identity (UID), project. The UID project has been integrated with the Home Ministry's National Population Register (NPR). The ůational Identification Authority of India Bill has been tabled in Parliament. Globally, observers of identity policies are watching if India learns anything from the Ã…ÃŽodern world. The experience with identity cards in the United Kingdom tells us that Mr. Blair's marketing of the scheme was from a platform of myths. First, he stated that enrolment for cards would be Å×oluntary? Second, he argued that the card would reduce leakages from the National Health System and other entitlement programmes; David Blunkett even called it not an ÅÊdentity card, but an ÅÆntitlement card. Third, Mr. Blair argued that the card would protect citizens from ÅÕerrorism and ÅÊdentity fraud. For this, the biometric technology was projected as infallible. All these claims were questioned by scholarly and public opinion. A meticulous report from the London School of Economics examined each claim and rejected them (see Å©igh-cost, High-risk, Frontline, August 14, 2009). This report argued that the government was making the card compulsory across such a wide range of schemes that it would, de facto, become compulsory. It also argued that the card would not end identity fraud in entitlement schemes. The reason: biometrics was not a reliable method of de-duplication. The Indian discourse around Aadhaar is remarkably similar. Almost identical arguments are forwarded in support of the project to provide a population of over one billion people with UID numbers. I argue that Aadhaar, just as its failed counterpart in the U.K., is promoted from a platform of myths. Here, there is space for three big myths only. Myth 1: Aadhaar number is not mandatory. This is wrong; Aadhaar has stealthily been made mandatory. Aadhaar is explicitly linked to the preparation of the NPR. The Census of India website notes that Ã…Ã…ata collected in the NPR will be subjected to de-duplication by the UIDAI [unique Identification Authority of India]. After de-duplication, the UIDAI will issue a UID Number. This UID Number will be part of the NPR and the NPR Cards will bear this UID Number. The NPR is the creation of an amendment in 2003 to the Citizenship Act of 1955. As per Rule 3(3) in the Citizenship Rules of 2003, information on every citizen in the National Register of Indian Citizens should compulsorily have his/her ůational Identity Number. Again, Rule 7(3) states that ÅÊt shall be the responsibility of every Citizen to register once with the Local Registrar of Citizen Registration and to provide correct individual particulars. Still further, Rule 17 states that ÅÂny violation of provisions of rules 5, 7, 8, 10, 11 and 14 shall be punishable with fine which may extend to one thousand rupees. The conclusion is simple: Aadhaar has been made compulsory, even before passing the Bill concerned in Parliament. Under the project's guise, the State is coercing individuals to part with personal information; this coercion comes with a threat of punishment. Myth 2: Aadhaar is just like the social security number (SSN) in the United States. There is a world of difference between the SSN and Aadhaar. The SSN was introduced in the U.S. in 1936 to facilitate provision of social security benefits. A defining feature of SSN is that it is circumscribed by the Privacy Act of 1974. This Act states that ÅÊt shall be unlawful for any©Èovernment agency to deny to any individual any right, benefit, or privilege provided by law because of such individual's refusal to disclose his social security account number. Further, federal agencies have to provide notice to, and obtain consent from, individuals before disclosing their SSNs to third parties. The SSN was never conceived as an identity document. However, in the 2000s, SSN began to be used widely for proving one's identity at different delivery/access points. As a result, SSNs of individuals were exposed to a wide array of private players, which identity thieves used to access bank accounts, credit accounts, utilities records and other sources of personal information. In 2006, the Government Accountability Office noted that Ã…Ãver a 1-year period, nearly 10 million people or 4.6 per cent of the adult U.S. population discovered that they were victims of some form of identity theft, translating into estimated losses exceeding $50 billion. Following public outcry, the President appointed a Task Force on Identity Theft in 2007. Acting on its report, the President notified a plan: Ťombating Identity Theft: A Strategic Plan. This plan directed all government offices to ÅÆliminate unnecessary uses of SSNs and reduction and, where possible, elimination of the need to use SSN to identify individuals. It's quite the contrary in India. According to Nandan Nilekani, Aadhaar number would become ÅÖbiquitous? he has even advised people to ÅÕattoo it somewhere, lest they forget it! Myth 3: Identity theft can be eliminated using biometrics. There is consensus among scientists and legal experts regarding the limitations of biometrics in proving identity. First, no accurate information exists on whether the errors of matching fingerprints are negligible or non-existent. A small percentage of users would always be either falsely matched or not matched at all against the database. Second, errors of matching would stand significantly amplified in countries like India. A report from 4G Identity Solutions, contracted by UIDAI for supply of biometric devices, notes that: Ūt is estimated that approximately five per cent of any population has unreadable fingerprints, either due to scars or aging or illegible prints. In the Indian environment, experience has shown that the failure to enrol is as high as 15 per cent due to the prevalence of a huge population dependent on manual labour. A 15 per cent failure rate would mean the exclusion of over 200 million people. If fingerprint readers are installed at Mahatma Gandhi National Rural Employment Guarantee Scheme (MNREGS) work sites and ration shops, and employment or purchases made contingent on correct authentication, about 200 million persons would remain permanently excluded from accessing such schemes. The report of the UIDAI's Å£iometrics Standards Committee actually accepts these concerns as real. Its report notes that ÅÇingerprint quality, the most important variable for determining de-duplication accuracy, has not been studied in depth in the Indian context. However, this critical limitation of the technology has not prevented the government from leaping into the dark with this project, one whose cost would exceed Rs.50,000 crore. It is said that the greatest enemy of truth is not the lie, but the myth. A democratic government should not undertake a project of the magnitude of Aadhaar from a platform of myths. The lesson from the U.K. experience is that myths perpetrated by governments can be exposed through consistent public campaigns. India direly needs a mass campaign that would expose the myths behind the Aadhaar project. (R. Ramakumar is Associate Professor with the Tata Institute of Social Sciences, Mumbai.)

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The UIDAI's response to the above article: UIDAI clarifies on Aadhaar R. S. Sharma Sept 15th, 2011

In his article “Aadhaar: on a platform of myths” (Edit Page, July 18), R. Ramakumar points to the failure of the U.K. National I.D. card project, the non-mandatory nature of the Social Security Number (S.S.N.) of the United States, and the possible failures of the biometric identification system to strengthen his case against Aadhaar. By doing so, he questions the motive of the project and the intentions of the government. At the onset, it is important to state that while myths are dangerous, half truths are even more damaging. The Unique Identification Authority of India (UIDAI) has consistently allayed misplaced fears by articulating facts. For the benefit of the readers of The Hindu, we wish to clarify the contours of the Aadhaar project. Firstly, the need for the intervention has to be understood. Millions of residents in India, especially the marginalised, lack nationally valid and reliable proof of identification. Aadhaar — backed by biometric de-duplication — is a secure and robust identification infrastructure that covers two shortcomings in the existing identity databases: fraud and duplication. Importantly, mandating Aadhaar in other databases for improvements in service delivery is the prerogative of the departments concerned. Moreover, UIDAI has consistently held that while it will not mandate Aadhaar, service providers could do the same while ensuring that there have been adequate opportunities for residents to enrol for Aadhaar. It has to be further clarified that there are no penal consequences if a person does not choose to get an Aadhaar number. The Registrar General of India (RGI) is one of the important registrars of the UIDAI (which follows a multi-registrar approach) having the responsibility of preparing the National Population Register (NPR) under the Citizenship Rules 2003. The UIDAI will issue Aadhaar numbers to residents who enrol for Aadhaar through the RGI. Secondly, viewing the Aadhaar exercise through the U.K./U.S. prisms is unfair since both those highly developed nations face problems that are dissimilar to those faced by India. Resultantly, the solutions also may need to be different. The S.S.N. scheme in the U.S. was originally established for the sole purpose of administering the Federal government's social security pension scheme. However, it has evolved from a single-purpose to a multi-purpose identifier and acts as the de-facto identifier for taxation purposes, to open bank accounts, to receive benefits from the state and for private services. Though the S.S.N. is not mandatory for U.S. residents, it is a requirement for all employed residents and some other categories of individuals. Service providers (government and private) are allowed to mandate S.S.N. in order to deliver services. Though U.S. privacy law does state that services cannot be denied if an individual does not reveal their S.S.N., it is important to note that the same law also requires that S.S.N. be disclosed if mandated by federal statute. Further, the law only requires that the individual be informed if it is mandatory or voluntary to disclose and under what authority the S.S.N. is being sought and how it will be used. While comparisons between India and the U.S. are not warranted, the fact remains that identifiers are an essential and integral need of an efficient public service delivery system. In India, just as the resident has the option to get an Aadhaar, a service provider may choose to use Aadhaar as an identification framework for delivering their services. The U.K. also has de-facto identifiers in the form of National Insurance and National Health Service (N.H.S.) numbers. The comparison of the introduction of a mandatory I.D. card in the U.K. in the context of security with a developmental initiative of the Government of India of Aadhaar is misleading and incorrect. Further, equating views on the impact of the U.K. I.D. card project to the Indian scenario is unjustified. Understanding biometrics Finally, the manner in which biometrics are being used in the Aadhaar project and the difference between a 1:N (during the time of enrolment) and a 1:1 check for authentication needs to be understood. At the time of enrolment, the resident's biometric data is compared to all other data sets in the UIDAI's CIDR (Central Identities Data Repository) to ensure uniqueness. During authentication, the resident's data is compared to the data linked to her/his Aadhaar number thereby significantly reducing scope for errors. The UIDAI recognises that no single technology is perfect but a combination of technologies can help reduce the possibility of inaccuracy. Therefore, in addition to collecting fingerprints, UIDAI also captures iris scans and a photograph. The Authority is aware of the technological limitations and is therefore using technology as appropriate and as required for the purpose of developing the identity infrastructure for India. Furthermore, since services cannot be denied in cases where residents may not have adequate and/or imperfect biometric attributes, the Authority has put in place an exception handling mechanism which ensures that the technology is reasonably supplemented so that it does not become an impediment between entitlements and beneficiaries. The Government of India spends a sizeable proportion of the taxpayers' money on hundreds of welfare schemes for the benefit of millions of people. To that effect, it recognises the importance of establishing an effective identification infrastructure for its residents and is committed to creating the same in a cost effective and secure manner. In fact, deliberations with regards to creating such an infrastructure have been taking place within policy circles since 2006. Therefore, to allege that such a critical project has been undertaken without due diligence is in fact a myth. The UIDAI has engaged in a series of consultations with multiple stakeholders and continues to do so as it implements the Aadhaar project, State-of-the-art technologies used in online railway reservation by the Indian Railways and the telecom revolution have convincingly demonstrated that India is capable of using high-end technology in the service of the common man and that we don't always need to follow the progression of developed nations to solve our unique problems. The Aadhaar project has a pro-poor, inclusive agenda which is an enabler for better delivery of services and enhanced transparency in governance. Comparing it to other I.D. projects in the western world without understanding its context is over-simplistic and needs to be countered. (R.S. Sharma is Director-General and Mission Director, UIDAI.)

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The Hindu's response to the UIDAI's replay: Response to UIDAI's clarification R. Ramakumar Sept 20th, 2011

R.S. Sharma's response (“UIDAI clarifies on Aadhaar,” Op-Ed Page, Sept.15) to my article titled “Aadhaar: On a platform of myths” (Edit Page, July 18) demands comprehensive rebuttal. In my article, I had raised three arguments related to Aadhaar. In these three respects, I characterised the arguments of the government as “myths”. Mr. Sharma tries to refute my arguments and calls them “half-truths”. This response is to challenge Mr. Sharma to point out where exactly are the half-truths in my article. My first argument was on the compulsoriness of Aadhaar, sought to be thrust through its linkages with the Home Ministry's National Population Register (NPR). I stand by it. The NPR is a part of the larger Multi-purpose National Identity Card (MNIC) project, begun after the Kargil war to cleanse India of “illegal immigration”. Registration in the NPR is compulsory. The information about individuals that is compulsorily required in the NPR includes a “National Identity Number”. It is the UIDAI's mandate to provide de-duplicated ID numbers to the NPR; and the ID number that would appear in the NPR will be the Aadhaar number. To quote Home Minister P. Chidambaram: “The MNIC has to be issued to every citizen, for which the Government has decided to set up a UID authority.” However, there is no mention of the collection of biometrics of individuals in Citizenship Rules 2003, which empowers the NPR. The collection of biometrics was stealthily made part of the NPR sometime after 2003. This stealth measure allowed the UIDAI to piggyback on NPR, thus allowing for quick enrolment. Mr. Sharma's effort is to hide this link, by stating that Registrar-General of India is just one of UIDAI's many Registrars. But are not the RGI and the UIDAI arms of the same government? Or, is it that the UIDAI considers control of “illegal immigration” as a “developmental initiative”? Secondly, at four places in his response, Mr. Sharma states that Aadhaar is not comparable with identity initiatives in the West. At no place, however, does he state what the specific problem in such a comparison is. Mr. Sharma cherry-picks from the U.S. federal statute to make his overstretched claim that the Social Security Number (SSN) is necessitated by law in the U.S. Yet, he neatly overlooks my arguments based on the U.S. President's “Strategic Plan” in 2007, which aimed to reduce/eliminate the use of SSN to identify individuals. How can Mr. Sharma claim that the SSN has “evolved” into a “de-facto identifier” in the U.S., when its own President is trying to reduce/eliminate its use? Thirdly, Mr. Sharma' position that biometric technology has “limitations” and will be used only “as appropriate and as required” represents an enormous climb-down from the UIDAI's earlier claims that biometric errors are insignificant. It is plausible that this climb-down is inspired by the enormous difficulties faced by the UIDAI in de-duplication and the rising costs therein. There is much to write about errors of biometrics, but it would suffice here to state that the UIDAI's Biometric Standards Committee had listed the limitations of this technology in its 2009 report. While noting the possibility of high error rates in using fingerprints under normal conditions, this report had shied away from providing any estimates of error in the use of IRIS images, owing to the “absence of empirical Indian data”. It suggested the use of IRIS images only “if they [the UIDAI] feel it is required”. However, this cautionary note did not prevent the UIDAI from plunging into IRIS data collection, even as no cost-benefit analysis for the overall project is anywhere in sight. Will anyone in the government stand up and be accountable for these spending decisions? (R. Ramakumar is with the Tata Institute of Social Sciences, Mumbai)

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