The Myth of 1965 victory ( Interesting article )

[ravishingravi]

http://www.viewpointonline.net/the-myth-of-the-1965-victory.html "Nationhood is a cultural artifact. It mixes political thought with literary expression, to carve out ideological boundaries of a place where a people are supposed to belong. With time, the factual historical content becomes irrelevant. What remains is a myth. Textbooks are an important method of disseminating that myth. Ūndia is our traditional enemy and we should always keep ourselves ready to defend our beloved country from Indian aggression, 11-year-olds are taught. The creation of Pakistan is justified with the two-nation theory - the idea that Muslims and Hindus in the subcontinent were two separate nations. India is the Other, without which there is no We. This national narrative defines a goal (security) and an enemy (India) and in doing so makes possible a meaningful co-existence of a diverse people who refer to themselves as a nation. It is not possible to mobilize people around confusion, and that is especially true in the context of the 1965 war, when Ayub KhanÃÔ approach of planned economy and social engineering had been producing outstanding results for several years. But a little confusion is a good if it can act as a safety valve against the recklessness that led to that war. Å¢s a general rule, Hindu morale would not stand more than a couple of hard blows delivered at the right time and the right place, said a directive by president Ayub Khan to General Muhammad Musa, the commander-in-chief of the Pakistan Army, on August 29 (Annexure G to GHQ Letter 4050/5/MO-1). To the utter surprise of then foreign minister Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto, who had drafted the text of the order, that turned out to be false. By that time Pakistan had already began Operation Gibraltar. On August 5 and 6, hundreds of poorly trained ÃÃŽujahids were into the Indian-held Kashmir with no clear goals with the expectation that Muslims of Kashmir will join them and revolt against the Indian government. That would legitimize a Pakistani troop movement into IHK (like a similar situation legitimized the movement of Indian troops in 1971 into what was then East Pakistan). Unfortunately for them, that did not happen. Muslims of IHK did not share the same narrative as Muslims of Pakistan. It took them another 35 years of oppression to realize they needed to rebel. Pakistan, with its superior military equipment donated by the US and a tactical victory in the Rann of Kachh, was confident India will not react to an incursion into Kashmir with a full-scale war. And that is why it launched Operation Grand Slam on September 1, with the intention to capture Akhnur and cut off the only road link between India and Kashmir. Half way through the excellent operation, the incursion that took India by surprise and met very little resistance, was stopped at Chhamb-Jurian and the 12 Div GOC Gen Akhtar Hussain Malik was relieved of the command of the operation. Gen Yahya Khan, who commanded 7 Div at that time, was flown in to take charge. According to Zulfikar Ali Bhutto, the intention behind the move was to make Yahya a hero. The delay caused by the decision gave the Indians enough time to consolidate their defence, and the operation failed. IndiaÃÔ attack on Lahore on September 6 was therefore not a sudden act of aggression on an unaware neighbor, as Pakistani textbooks claim, but an unexpected retaliation. A plan approved by the Indian Cabinet in 1949 for such a situation, said Ūndian troops in Kashmir would seek to contain the opposing forces while the main Indian field army made a determined and rapid advance towards Lahore and Sialkot. That is exactly what they did. ŵhe primary aim of this strategy, according to A Wright, ÅØas to inflict a decisive defeat on PakistanÃÔ field army and, along with the possible occupation of Lahore, to compell the Pakistan government to seek peace. With its morale hurt by the humiliating loss to China in 1962 and the defeat in Rann of Kachh, the Indian military was keen on using its newly acquired weapons (meant to be used against China) to restore its reputation. Like Pakistam, India too wanted to catch the enemy unaware and capture as much land as possible. Like Pakistan, India too failed to do that. In the ensuing see-saw battles in and around Lahore and Sialkot, Pakistan Army did a very good job at defending its territory, but they did nothing that could even be remotely regarded as a victory. The only time Pakistan came near a victory was a 1FF/6 Lancers flawless counter-advance towards Khem Kharan. According to military historian Brian Cloughley, Ūn spite of the elan and determination shown by the armoured regiments and infantry battalions, there was no comparable display of drive and energy on the part of some of their senior commanders. After making advances several miles inwards of Khem Kharan surprised India (which had erred by not accounting for the new 6 Armoured Div), the troops were told to withdraw to Khem Kharan not once but twice. That gave India enough time to prepare a trap for the next advance, in which Pakistan fell, losing a total of 40 tanks. Ūt was obvious, wrote Cloughley, ÅÕhat outstanding leadership at the junior level, as well as gallantry and good equipment, excellent artillery support and high morale do not compensate for inappropriate reconaissance, lack of press-on spirit in commanders, poor communications, shockingly bad command at the highest levels, and indifferent logistical planning. While it is obvious there was no clear winner or loser in the 1965 war, there are important lessons to be learned. One of them is, the military should not be politicised and its top leaders should not be chosen for loyalty rather than merit. These lessons need to be included in the national narrative."