Tibetan Declaration of Independence

[CasualVisitor]

Well I've met the Dalai Llama a few times and he is extremely reluctant to talk about it. When it comes to politics, he is a very distrusting fellow- thinks/gives off the notion that anyone asking him about Tibet is going to run to the papers with a 'The Dalai Llama said this' scoop and cause international incident. Is also really scared of China. 

IMO, he is like Gandhi in Gandhi's last few years : doesnt care about the politics/political responsibilities, is happy with his spiritual responsibilities and status and is keen on preserving that- even if it means political FUBAR.

He thinks that Tibet declaring independence = China will go on a killing spree, India is too soft to really go into war (even today or 50 years ago) & so basically thinks that if he declares, lots of people, including possibly himself, will be killed but nothing else would happen.

He doesnt want to go down as 'The Dalai Llama who took a stance that killed many, possibly tens of thousands of people'.

 

The closest he's come to saying 'F U China' is saying that if things do not improve, he will choose 'not to re-incarnate', aka ending the lineage of the Dalai Llama. 

Which would be a risky move- on one hand, it will incense the Tibetans into an uprising but on the other, if the uprising fails, then China can claim 'well your spiritual leader officially stated he is not re-incarnating, so office of Dalai Llama is defunct' and remove that enormous cultural heritage and office of prestige amongst the Tibetans. Atleast right now China officially 'manages' the Tibetan Llama traditions and positions. 

 

 

Thanks for that elaborate response. Seems to me that the DL is not doing the right thing in here. Its high time that he catches the bull by its horn.

 

Sent from my SM-N9208 using Tapatalk

 

 

[zen]

8 hours ago, Vilander said:

Tibet should be free and Kashmir is an Indian state, thats the Indian stand. 

If Tibet is a part of China, it could mean handing over Arunachal Pradesh (South Tibet) to China. The "McMohan line" border agreement (posted in post 161) was done with Tibet. China claims that the agreement is invalid as Tibet is a part of China and not authorized to carry out such negotiations

 

Tibet has also suffered because of double standards of the west which, on one hand, leveraged on Tibet's independence, and, on the other hand, also tried to please China, resulting in a situation where China used "liberating" Tibet from external forces to enforce the 17 point agreement

 

 

 

 

Edited March 8, 2017 by zen

[zen]

National interests >>>>> individuals like Nehru

 

It was and is in Ind's interest to build a strong case for Tibet .... and when Tibet chose to be guided by Ind 

Edited March 8, 2017 by zen

[zen]

PS talking about Ind-China, at that time, the "hindi-chini bhai bhai" nara was making the rounds .... Nehru made an agreement with China accepting China's position on Tibet. When asked about the McMohan line, Nehru claimed that since China did not bring the issue up, it is settled .... what China did was play a smart game. Made Nehru accept the terms and then raised the issue on Arunachal Pradesh (South Tibet) 

 

And ofc, Nehru also backed China for UN. As we know, how China now opposes many Indian concerns in UN 

 

http://indiafacts.org/nehru-and-the-china-tibet-blunder/

 

 

In the year 1950, two momentous events shook Asia and the world. One was the Chinese invasion of Tibet, and the other, the Chinese intervention in the Korean War. The first was near, on India’s borders, the other, far away in the Korean Peninsula where India had little at stake. By all canons of logic, India should have devoted utmost attention to the immediate situation in Tibet, and let interested parties like China and the U.S. sort it out in Korea.

But Jawaharlal Nehru, India’s Prime Minister did exactly the opposite. He treated the Tibetan crisis in a haphazard fashion, while getting heavily involved in Korea. India today is paying for this folly by being the only country of its size in the world without an official boundary with its giant neighbor. Tibet soon disappeared from the map. As in Kashmir, Nehru sacrificed national interest at home in pursuit of international glory abroad.

India at the time maintained missions in Lhasa and Gyangtse. Due to the close relations that existed between India and Tibet going back centuries and also because of the unsettled conditions in China, Tibet’s transactions with the outside world were conducted mainly through India. Well into 1950, the Indian Government regarded Tibet as a free country.

The Chinese announced their invasion of Tibet on 25 October 1950. According to them, it was to ‘free Tibet from imperialist forces’, and consolidate its border with India. Nehru announced that he and the Indian Government were ‘extremely perplexed and disappointed with the Chinese Government’s action...’ Nehru also complained that he had been ‘led to believe by the Chinese Foreign Office that the Chinese would settle the future of Tibet in a peaceful manner by direct negotiation with the representatives of Tibet…’

This was not true, for in September 1949, more than a year before the Chinese invasion, Nehru himself had written: “Chinese communists are likely to invade Tibet.” The point to note is that Nehru, by sending mixed signals, showing more interest in Korea than in Tibet, had encouraged the Chinese invasion; the Chinese had made no secret of their desire to invade Tibet. In spite of this, Nehru’s main interest was to sponsor China as a member of the UN Security Council instead of safeguarding Indian interests in Tibet.

Because of this, when the Chinese were moving troops into Tibet, there was little concern in Indian official circles. Panikkar, the Indian Ambassador in Beijing, went so far as to pretend that there was ‘lack of confirmation’ of the presence of Chinese troops in Tibet and that to protest the Chinese invasion of Tibet would be an “interference to India’s efforts on behalf of China in the UN”. So Panikkar was more interested in protecting Chinese interests in the UN than India’s own interests on the Tibetan border! Nehru agreed with his Ambassador. He wrote, “our primary consideration is maintenance of world peace… Recent developments in Korea have not strengthened China’s position, which will be further weakened by any aggressive action [by India] in Tibet.” So Nehru was ready to sacrifice India’s national security interests in Tibet so as not to weaken China’s case in the UN!

It is nothing short of tragedy that the two greatest influences on Nehru at this crucial juncture in history were Krishna Menon and K.M. Panikkar, both communists. Panikkar, while nominally serving as Indian ambassador in China, became practically a spokesman for Chinese interests in Tibet. Sardar Patel remarked that Panikkar “has been at great pains to find an explanation or justification for Chinese policy and actions.” India eventually gave up its right to have a diplomatic mission in Lhasa on the ground that it was an ‘imperialist legacy’. This led to Nehru’s discredited ‘Hindi-Chini Bhai Bhai’. Mao had no reciprocal affection for India and never spoke of ‘Chini-Hindi Bhai Bhai’— or its Chinese equivalent. Far from it, he had only contempt for India and its leaders. Mao respected only the strong who would oppose him, and not the weak who bent over backwards to please him.

Sardar Patel warned Nehru: ‘Even though we regard ourselves as friends of China, the Chinese do not regard us as friends.” He wrote a famous letter in which he expressed deep concern over developments in Tibet, raising several important points. In particular, he noted that a free and friendly Tibet was vital for India’s security, and everything including military measures should be considered to ensure it.’

On November 9, 1950, two days after he wrote the letter to Nehru, he announced in Delhi: ‘In Kali Yuga, we shall return ahimsa for ahimsa. If anybody resorts to force against us, we shall meet it with force.’ But Nehru ignored Patel’s letter. The truth is that India was in a strong position to defend its interests in Tibet, but gave up the opportunity for the sake of pleasing China. It is not widely known in India that in 1950, China could have been prevented from taking over Tibet."

[Vilander]

7 minutes ago, zen said:

PS talking about Ind-China, at that time, the "hindi-chini bhai bhai" nara was making the rounds .... Nehru made an agreement with China accepting China's position on Tibet. When asked about the McMohan line, Nehru claimed that since China did not bring the issue up, it is settled .... what China did was play a smart game. Made Nehru accept the terms and then raised the issue on Arunachal Pradesh (South Tibet) 

 

And ofc, Nehru also backed China for UN. As we know, how China now opposes many Indian concerns in UN 

 

http://indiafacts.org/nehru-and-the-china-tibet-blunder/

 

 

In the year 1950, two momentous events shook Asia and the world. One was the Chinese invasion of Tibet, and the other, the Chinese intervention in the Korean War. The first was near, on India’s borders, the other, far away in the Korean Peninsula where India had little at stake. By all canons of logic, India should have devoted utmost attention to the immediate situation in Tibet, and let interested parties like China and the U.S. sort it out in Korea.

But Jawaharlal Nehru, India’s Prime Minister did exactly the opposite. He treated the Tibetan crisis in a haphazard fashion, while getting heavily involved in Korea. India today is paying for this folly by being the only country of its size in the world without an official boundary with its giant neighbor. Tibet soon disappeared from the map. As in Kashmir, Nehru sacrificed national interest at home in pursuit of international glory abroad.

India at the time maintained missions in Lhasa and Gyangtse. Due to the close relations that existed between India and Tibet going back centuries and also because of the unsettled conditions in China, Tibet’s transactions with the outside world were conducted mainly through India. Well into 1950, the Indian Government regarded Tibet as a free country.

The Chinese announced their invasion of Tibet on 25 October 1950. According to them, it was to ‘free Tibet from imperialist forces’, and consolidate its border with India. Nehru announced that he and the Indian Government were ‘extremely perplexed and disappointed with the Chinese Government’s action...’ Nehru also complained that he had been ‘led to believe by the Chinese Foreign Office that the Chinese would settle the future of Tibet in a peaceful manner by direct negotiation with the representatives of Tibet…’

This was not true, for in September 1949, more than a year before the Chinese invasion, Nehru himself had written: “Chinese communists are likely to invade Tibet.” The point to note is that Nehru, by sending mixed signals, showing more interest in Korea than in Tibet, had encouraged the Chinese invasion; the Chinese had made no secret of their desire to invade Tibet. In spite of this, Nehru’s main interest was to sponsor China as a member of the UN Security Council instead of safeguarding Indian interests in Tibet.

Because of this, when the Chinese were moving troops into Tibet, there was little concern in Indian official circles. Panikkar, the Indian Ambassador in Beijing, went so far as to pretend that there was ‘lack of confirmation’ of the presence of Chinese troops in Tibet and that to protest the Chinese invasion of Tibet would be an “interference to India’s efforts on behalf of China in the UN”. So Panikkar was more interested in protecting Chinese interests in the UN than India’s own interests on the Tibetan border! Nehru agreed with his Ambassador. He wrote, “our primary consideration is maintenance of world peace… Recent developments in Korea have not strengthened China’s position, which will be further weakened by any aggressive action [by India] in Tibet.” So Nehru was ready to sacrifice India’s national security interests in Tibet so as not to weaken China’s case in the UN!

It is nothing short of tragedy that the two greatest influences on Nehru at this crucial juncture in history were Krishna Menon and K.M. Panikkar, both communists. Panikkar, while nominally serving as Indian ambassador in China, became practically a spokesman for Chinese interests in Tibet. Sardar Patel remarked that Panikkar “has been at great pains to find an explanation or justification for Chinese policy and actions.” India eventually gave up its right to have a diplomatic mission in Lhasa on the ground that it was an ‘imperialist legacy’. This led to Nehru’s discredited ‘Hindi-Chini Bhai Bhai’. Mao had no reciprocal affection for India and never spoke of ‘Chini-Hindi Bhai Bhai’— or its Chinese equivalent. Far from it, he had only contempt for India and its leaders. Mao respected only the strong who would oppose him, and not the weak who bent over backwards to please him.

Sardar Patel warned Nehru: ‘Even though we regard ourselves as friends of China, the Chinese do not regard us as friends.” He wrote a famous letter in which he expressed deep concern over developments in Tibet, raising several important points. In particular, he noted that a free and friendly Tibet was vital for India’s security, and everything including military measures should be considered to ensure it.’

On November 9, 1950, two days after he wrote the letter to Nehru, he announced in Delhi: ‘In Kali Yuga, we shall return ahimsa for ahimsa. If anybody resorts to force against us, we shall meet it with force.’ But Nehru ignored Patel’s letter. The truth is that India was in a strong position to defend its interests in Tibet, but gave up the opportunity for the sake of pleasing China. It is not widely known in India that in 1950, China could have been prevented from taking over Tibet."

Piece of crap pseudo leftist should be dealt with extreme prejudice on principle.

[zen]

As many folks here may recall, how China tries to bully countries which talk about DL and Tibet:

 

Summary

China has voiced its displeasure with a reported plan by the city of Paris to grant the Dalai Lama honorary citizenship. China's problems with France run deeper than this one issue, however, and Beijing's response is likely to take an economic shape.

 

Analysis

The Chinese Foreign Ministry on May 7 expressed its opposition to a reported plan by the city of Paris to grant honorary citizenship to the Dalai Lama. The ministry spokesman warned that such a move could undermine the recent thaw in relations between China and France, and urged Paris to "stop doing things that interfere in China's internal affairs." Beijing's problems with France go deeper than the question of the Dalai Lama, however, and Beijing is likely to respond with economic tools.

 

For months, China has been waging a rhetorical (and at times economic) battle with France, with Chinese consumers boycotting the French Carrefour stores and French goods in China in early 2008 over reports that the company supported the Dalai Lama, and in response to pro-Tibet activists disrupting the Olympic torch run in France. But tensions grew particularly heated when French President Nicolas Sarkozy met with the Dalai Lama in Poland in December 2008.

 

While Beijing normally fumes when a head of state meets with the Tibetan spiritual leader, Beijing saw Sarkozy's action as more than the standard fare, as he was the first European head of state to meet with the Dalai Lama while holding the rotating presidency of the European Union — a move China feared could be interpreted as EU support for the Tibetan movement. In response, Beijing canceled a planned China-EU summit and renewed threats against French trade.

 

In January, during Chinese Premier Wen Jiabao's visit to Europe, he conspicuously skipped a stop in France. In a follow-up European tour of nearly 200 Chinese business leaders led by Commerce Minister Chen Deming, France was again bypassed as Beijing signed some $13 billion in European deals, mostly with Germany and the United Kingdom. The message was clear: If France did not change its attitude, China would take its business elsewhere. Beijing had hoped that Airbus, as well as French nuclear power and high-speed rail companies, would pressure Paris into changing its behavior or at least reducing tensions with Beijing in order to gain access to lucrative Chinese contracts as Beijing increased spending on infrastructure projects.

 

But China was not only concerned about the Dalai Lama. Beijing has long tolerated world leaders meeting the Tibetan leader without altering trade deals and without year-long protests. The Tibet issue certainly gave Beijing an opportunity to rally Chinese popular support for pressuring France, but underlying the strained relations were conflicting views on how to reshape the global financial architecture amid the global economic crisis.

 

It is, perhaps, no coincidence that Chinese-French relations bottomed out again in late 2008, as the world began seeking a global solution to the economic crisis. France, which called for the first emergency G-20 meeting, was seeking to keep Europe and the United States as the core of whatever new framework emerges from the crisis, while China was seeking to replace the current global framework with one focused not on trans-Atlantic trade and relations but on trans-Pacific trade, with the United States and China as the core. More specifically, France and Europe promoted stronger global financial regulatory authorities, something China was less keen on. This has been the underlying friction between China and France, and one that could evolve into a wider conflict between China and Europe: where the global economic system is to be centered.

 

And this battle has not ended. For China, the constant friction with France is less risky than taking a similar approach to a country like Germany, which has more leverage as a trading partner with China. Among European Union countries, in 2008 France was China's fourth-largest trading partner, fourth-largest source of foreign direct investment and second most significant partner in introducing technology to the Chinese market. In the first three quarters of 2008, France was China's 17th-largest trading partner overall. China, however, is France's seventh-largest trading partner (and first among Asian nations). From Beijing's perspective, China has the upper hand in a trade-based confrontation with France.

 

https://www.stratfor.com/analysis/china-france-problem-larger-tibet

 

 

Edited March 8, 2017 by zen

[zen]

http://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/india/china-warns-india-over-invite-to-dalai-lama-to-buddhist-meet/articleshow/57733710.cms

 

China warns India over invite to Dalai Lama to Buddhist meet

 

BEIJING: China on Monday warned India not to go against its "core concerns" to avoid "disruption" in bilateral ties after New Delhi invited the Tibetan spiritual leader Dalai Lama to an international Buddhist seminar in Bihar.

"In recent days the Indian side, in total disregard of China's stern representation and strong opposition, insisted on inviting the 14th Dalai Lama to attend the international conference on Buddhism held by the Indian government," foreign ministry spokesperson Hua Chunying told reporters here.

"China is strongly dissatisfied and firmly opposed to it," she said.

"We urge the Indian side to clearly see the anti-China splittist nature of the Dalai group and honour its commitment on Tibet and related questions, respect China's core concerns and avoid China-India relations from being further disrupted and undermined," she said

 

 

[Mariyam]

What is the consensus finally?

China is evil? The Dalai Lama is intentionally provocative? Tibet was never a nation?

 

India wants to know.

[zen]

42 minutes ago, Mariyam said:

What is the consensus finally?

China is evil? The Dalai Lama is intentionally provocative? Tibet was never a nation?

 

India wants to know.

Tibet was and is a nation 

[Muloghonto]

48 minutes ago, Mariyam said:

What is the consensus finally?

China is evil? The Dalai Lama is intentionally provocative? Tibet was never a nation?

 

India wants to know.

1. China is evil

2. Dalai Llama is a coward and has dereliction of duty towards his political post

3. Tibet has not been a nation in well over 500 years. Nobody has ever officially recognized it as such and it has never officially declared independence. 

[zen]

 

 

 

 

 

 

Edited March 22, 2017 by zen

[zen]

#CanadaStandsWithTibet

[zen]

Murals of Tibet 

 

^ $16k book