If there was a general election tommorow, who would you vote for?

[someone]

Modi would win in a landslide if only people with internet access voted.

Modi and certainly BJP would be in majority if all Indians went out to vote.

[Mariyam]

Modi and certainly BJP would be in majority if all Indians went out to vote.

On the basis of what do you make this claim? My politically untrained mind tells me that if all Indians indeed were to vote, regional parties would be a lot stronger. Even more than what they are today.

[Yoda-esque]

Which government – UPA or NDA – has been better for India’s economic and social indicators? Dismiss the rhetoric and stick to the facts. In this analysis, I’ve chosen 10 key parameters. They cover both economic and social criteria. 1.GDP growth: Average GDP growth in 1998-2004 (NDA) was 6% a year. Average annual GDP growth in 2004-13 (UPA), up to June 30, 2013, was 7.9%. Caveat 1: The Vajpayee-led NDA battled US-led economic sanctions following the Pokhran-II nuclear test in May 1998. It faced a short but expensive Kargil war in 1999 and the dotcom bust in 2000. When it took office, it had the lag effect of the East Asian financial crisis of 1997-98 to contend with. Caveat 2: The UPA government, in contrast, benefitted from the economic momentum of the high (8.1%) GDP growth rate of 2003-04 – the NDA government’s final year – and rode that wave. The global liquidity bubble in 2004-08 bouyed foreign inflows, helping UPA-I achieve a high GDP growth rate in its first term. The Lehman Brothers collapse in September 2008 did hurt the Indian economy but the ensuing US Federal Reserve asset buying programme attracted a steady flow of near-zero interest dollars into India from 2009. Despite these caveats, the UPA government’s average annual GDP growth rate of 7.9% in 2004-13 clearly scores over the NDA government’s average annual growth rate of 6% (though high inflation boosted the former significantly). First strike to UPA. 2. Current Account Deficit: 2004: (+) $7.36 billion (surplus). 2013: (-) $80 billion. The winner here is clearly NDA. It ran a current account surplus in 2002, 2003 and 2004. Under UPA this dipped into deficit from 2006 and has spun downwards since. 3. Trade deficit: 2004: (-) $13.16 billion. 2013: (-) $180 billion. Again, advantage NDA. 4. Fiscal deficit: 2004: 4.7% of GDP. 2013: 4.8% of GDP. Not much to choose between the two. Caveat: This extract from the Asian Development Bank Institute (ADBI) report, published in 2010, explains why and when the UPA government’s fiscal defict began to spiral out of control. “The central budget in 2008–2009, announced in February 2008, seemed to continue the progress towards FRBM targets by showing a low fiscal deficit of 2.5% of GDP. However, the 2008–2009 budget quite clearly made inadequate allowances for rural schemes like the farm loan waiver and the expansion of social security schemes under the National Rural Employment Guarantee Act (NREGA), the Sixth Pay Commission award and subsidies for food, fertilizer, and petroleum.” “These together pushed up the fiscal deficit sharply to higher levels. There were also off-budget items like the issue of oil and fertilizer bonds, which should be added to give a true picture of fiscal deficit in 2008–2009. The fiscal deficit shot up to 8.9% of GDP (10.7% including off-budget bonds) against 5.0% in 2007–2008 and the primary surplus turned into a deficit of 3.5% of GDP. “The huge increase in public expenditure in 2008–2009 of 31.2% that followed a 27.4% increase in 2007–2008 was driven by the electoral cycle with parliamentary elections scheduled within a year of the announcement of the budget.” The recent announcement of the Seventh Pay Commission comes again, not unexpectedly, at the end of an electoral cycle. 5. Inflation: 1998-2004: 5%. 2004-2013: 9% (Both figures are averaged out over their respective tenures). Advantage again to NDA. Inflation under NDA was on average half that under UPA, leading to the RBI’s controversial tight money policy, high interest rates and rising EMIs. 6. External Debt: March 2004: $111.6 billion. March 2013: $390 billion. The UPA suffers badly in this comparision, a result of lack of confidence in India’s economy and currency following retrospective tax legislation and other regressive policies, especially during UPA-2. 7. Jobs: 1999-2004: 60 million new jobs created. 2004-11: 14.6 million jobs created. Clearly, the UPA’s big failure has been jobless growth – a bad electoral omen. 8. Rupee: 1998-2004: Variation: Rs. 39 to 49 per $. 2004-13: Variation: Rs. 39 to 68 per $. (Rupee rose from 40-plus to 39 between October 2007 and April 2008.) The NDA government’s economic and fiscal policies, despite the various crises of 1998-2000 pointed out earlier, evoked more global confidence, leading to a relatively stable rupee (Rs. 10 variation) compared to the Rs. 29 variation during UPA’s tenure. 9. HDI: 2004: India was ranked 123rd globally on the human development index (HDI) in 2004, with a score of 0.453. 2013: India has slipped 13 places to 136th globally on the HDI in 2013 with a score of 0.554. 10. Subsidies: 2004: Rs. 44,327 crore. 2013: Rs. 2,31,584 crore. Here again, profligate welfarism, as the ADBI report quoted earlier shows, has led to a rising subsidy bill. Worse, a significant amount is siphoned off by a corrupt nexus of politicians, officials and middlemen. Conclusion: UPA scores above NDA on one of the 10 parameters (GDP growth), is level on one other parameter (fiscal deficit) while NDA does better than UPA on the remaining eight parameters. The next time Finance Minister P. Chidambaram wishes to stage an encounter with facts, he would do well to be aware of those facts. Sources: Economic Survey of India, UNDP, IMF, Planning Commission of India. http://blogs.timesofindia.indiatimes.com/headon/entry/upa-vs-nda-setting-the-economic-record-straight :giggle:

[Clarke]

You forgot 2002. NDA gets -100 on a grading system of 1 to 10. UPA wins!

[Clarke]

BTW MMS delivers a 'tough' speech in NYC

[zumi]

Which government – UPA or NDA – has been better for India’s economic and social indicators? Dismiss the rhetoric and stick to the facts. In this analysis, I’ve chosen 10 key parameters. They cover both economic and social criteria. 1.GDP growth: Average GDP growth in 1998-2004 (NDA) was 6% a year. Average annual GDP growth in 2004-13 (UPA), up to June 30, 2013, was 7.9%. Caveat 1: The Vajpayee-led NDA battled US-led economic sanctions following the Pokhran-II nuclear test in May 1998. It faced a short but expensive Kargil war in 1999 and the dotcom bust in 2000. When it took office, it had the lag effect of the East Asian financial crisis of 1997-98 to contend with. Caveat 2: The UPA government, in contrast, benefitted from the economic momentum of the high (8.1%) GDP growth rate of 2003-04 – the NDA government’s final year – and rode that wave. The global liquidity bubble in 2004-08 bouyed foreign inflows, helping UPA-I achieve a high GDP growth rate in its first term. The Lehman Brothers collapse in September 2008 did hurt the Indian economy but the ensuing US Federal Reserve asset buying programme attracted a steady flow of near-zero interest dollars into India from 2009. Despite these caveats, the UPA government’s average annual GDP growth rate of 7.9% in 2004-13 clearly scores over the NDA government’s average annual growth rate of 6% (though high inflation boosted the former significantly). First strike to UPA. 2. Current Account Deficit: 2004: (+) $7.36 billion (surplus). 2013: (-) $80 billion. The winner here is clearly NDA. It ran a current account surplus in 2002, 2003 and 2004. Under UPA this dipped into deficit from 2006 and has spun downwards since. 3. Trade deficit: 2004: (-) $13.16 billion. 2013: (-) $180 billion. Again, advantage NDA. 4. Fiscal deficit: 2004: 4.7% of GDP. 2013: 4.8% of GDP. Not much to choose between the two. Caveat: This extract from the Asian Development Bank Institute (ADBI) report, published in 2010, explains why and when the UPA government’s fiscal defict began to spiral out of control. “The central budget in 2008–2009, announced in February 2008, seemed to continue the progress towards FRBM targets by showing a low fiscal deficit of 2.5% of GDP. However, the 2008–2009 budget quite clearly made inadequate allowances for rural schemes like the farm loan waiver and the expansion of social security schemes under the National Rural Employment Guarantee Act (NREGA), the Sixth Pay Commission award and subsidies for food, fertilizer, and petroleum.†“These together pushed up the fiscal deficit sharply to higher levels. There were also off-budget items like the issue of oil and fertilizer bonds, which should be added to give a true picture of fiscal deficit in 2008–2009. The fiscal deficit shot up to 8.9% of GDP (10.7% including off-budget bonds) against 5.0% in 2007–2008 and the primary surplus turned into a deficit of 3.5% of GDP. “The huge increase in public expenditure in 2008–2009 of 31.2% that followed a 27.4% increase in 2007–2008 was driven by the electoral cycle with parliamentary elections scheduled within a year of the announcement of the budget.†The recent announcement of the Seventh Pay Commission comes again, not unexpectedly, at the end of an electoral cycle. 5. Inflation: 1998-2004: 5%. 2004-2013: 9% (Both figures are averaged out over their respective tenures). Advantage again to NDA. Inflation under NDA was on average half that under UPA, leading to the RBI’s controversial tight money policy, high interest rates and rising EMIs. 6. External Debt: March 2004: $111.6 billion. March 2013: $390 billion. The UPA suffers badly in this comparision, a result of lack of confidence in India’s economy and currency following retrospective tax legislation and other regressive policies, especially during UPA-2. 7. Jobs: 1999-2004: 60 million new jobs created. 2004-11: 14.6 million jobs created. Clearly, the UPA’s big failure has been jobless growth – a bad electoral omen. 8. Rupee: 1998-2004: Variation: Rs. 39 to 49 per $. 2004-13: Variation: Rs. 39 to 68 per $. (Rupee rose from 40-plus to 39 between October 2007 and April 2008.) The NDA government’s economic and fiscal policies, despite the various crises of 1998-2000 pointed out earlier, evoked more global confidence, leading to a relatively stable rupee (Rs. 10 variation) compared to the Rs. 29 variation during UPA’s tenure. 9. HDI: 2004: India was ranked 123rd globally on the human development index (HDI) in 2004, with a score of 0.453. 2013: India has slipped 13 places to 136th globally on the HDI in 2013 with a score of 0.554. 10. Subsidies: 2004: Rs. 44,327 crore. 2013: Rs. 2,31,584 crore. Here again, profligate welfarism, as the ADBI report quoted earlier shows, has led to a rising subsidy bill. Worse, a significant amount is siphoned off by a corrupt nexus of politicians, officials and middlemen. Conclusion: UPA scores above NDA on one of the 10 parameters (GDP growth), is level on one other parameter (fiscal deficit) while NDA does better than UPA on the remaining eight parameters. The next time Finance Minister P. Chidambaram wishes to stage an encounter with facts, he would do well to be aware of those facts. Sources: Economic Survey of India, UNDP, IMF, Planning Commission of India. http://blogs.timesofindia.indiatimes.com/headon/entry/upa-vs-nda-setting-the-economic-record-straight :giggle:

plasterd :giggle: most hopeless goverment currently in the world

[Yoda-esque]

plasterd :giggle: most hopeless goverment currently in the world

But it ij pshecular no?(hic)

[ravishingravi]

Which government – UPA or NDA – has been better for India’s economic and social indicators? Dismiss the rhetoric and stick to the facts. In this analysis, I’ve chosen 10 key parameters. They cover both economic and social criteria. 1.GDP growth: Average GDP growth in 1998-2004 (NDA) was 6% a year. Average annual GDP growth in 2004-13 (UPA), up to June 30, 2013, was 7.9%. Caveat 1: The Vajpayee-led NDA battled US-led economic sanctions following the Pokhran-II nuclear test in May 1998. It faced a short but expensive Kargil war in 1999 and the dotcom bust in 2000. When it took office, it had the lag effect of the East Asian financial crisis of 1997-98 to contend with. Caveat 2: The UPA government, in contrast, benefitted from the economic momentum of the high (8.1%) GDP growth rate of 2003-04 – the NDA government’s final year – and rode that wave. The global liquidity bubble in 2004-08 bouyed foreign inflows, helping UPA-I achieve a high GDP growth rate in its first term. The Lehman Brothers collapse in September 2008 did hurt the Indian economy but the ensuing US Federal Reserve asset buying programme attracted a steady flow of near-zero interest dollars into India from 2009. Despite these caveats, the UPA government’s average annual GDP growth rate of 7.9% in 2004-13 clearly scores over the NDA government’s average annual growth rate of 6% (though high inflation boosted the former significantly). First strike to UPA. 2. Current Account Deficit: 2004: (+) $7.36 billion (surplus). 2013: (-) $80 billion. The winner here is clearly NDA. It ran a current account surplus in 2002, 2003 and 2004. Under UPA this dipped into deficit from 2006 and has spun downwards since. 3. Trade deficit: 2004: (-) $13.16 billion. 2013: (-) $180 billion. Again, advantage NDA. 4. Fiscal deficit: 2004: 4.7% of GDP. 2013: 4.8% of GDP. Not much to choose between the two. Caveat: This extract from the Asian Development Bank Institute (ADBI) report, published in 2010, explains why and when the UPA government’s fiscal defict began to spiral out of control. “The central budget in 2008–2009, announced in February 2008, seemed to continue the progress towards FRBM targets by showing a low fiscal deficit of 2.5% of GDP. However, the 2008–2009 budget quite clearly made inadequate allowances for rural schemes like the farm loan waiver and the expansion of social security schemes under the National Rural Employment Guarantee Act (NREGA), the Sixth Pay Commission award and subsidies for food, fertilizer, and petroleum.” “These together pushed up the fiscal deficit sharply to higher levels. There were also off-budget items like the issue of oil and fertilizer bonds, which should be added to give a true picture of fiscal deficit in 2008–2009. The fiscal deficit shot up to 8.9% of GDP (10.7% including off-budget bonds) against 5.0% in 2007–2008 and the primary surplus turned into a deficit of 3.5% of GDP. “The huge increase in public expenditure in 2008–2009 of 31.2% that followed a 27.4% increase in 2007–2008 was driven by the electoral cycle with parliamentary elections scheduled within a year of the announcement of the budget.” The recent announcement of the Seventh Pay Commission comes again, not unexpectedly, at the end of an electoral cycle. 5. Inflation: 1998-2004: 5%. 2004-2013: 9% (Both figures are averaged out over their respective tenures). Advantage again to NDA. Inflation under NDA was on average half that under UPA, leading to the RBI’s controversial tight money policy, high interest rates and rising EMIs. 6. External Debt: March 2004: $111.6 billion. March 2013: $390 billion. The UPA suffers badly in this comparision, a result of lack of confidence in India’s economy and currency following retrospective tax legislation and other regressive policies, especially during UPA-2. 7. Jobs: 1999-2004: 60 million new jobs created. 2004-11: 14.6 million jobs created. Clearly, the UPA’s big failure has been jobless growth – a bad electoral omen. 8. Rupee: 1998-2004: Variation: Rs. 39 to 49 per $. 2004-13: Variation: Rs. 39 to 68 per $. (Rupee rose from 40-plus to 39 between October 2007 and April 2008.) The NDA government’s economic and fiscal policies, despite the various crises of 1998-2000 pointed out earlier, evoked more global confidence, leading to a relatively stable rupee (Rs. 10 variation) compared to the Rs. 29 variation during UPA’s tenure. 9. HDI: 2004: India was ranked 123rd globally on the human development index (HDI) in 2004, with a score of 0.453. 2013: India has slipped 13 places to 136th globally on the HDI in 2013 with a score of 0.554. 10. Subsidies: 2004: Rs. 44,327 crore. 2013: Rs. 2,31,584 crore. Here again, profligate welfarism, as the ADBI report quoted earlier shows, has led to a rising subsidy bill. Worse, a significant amount is siphoned off by a corrupt nexus of politicians, officials and middlemen. Conclusion: UPA scores above NDA on one of the 10 parameters (GDP growth), is level on one other parameter (fiscal deficit) while NDA does better than UPA on the remaining eight parameters. The next time Finance Minister P. Chidambaram wishes to stage an encounter with facts, he would do well to be aware of those facts. Sources: Economic Survey of India, UNDP, IMF, Planning Commission of India. http://blogs.timesofindia.indiatimes.com/headon/entry/upa-vs-nda-setting-the-economic-record-straight :giggle:

Nein Nein. All lies. Let me do some google search and prove it wrong. "BJP+corruption+scandal+Communal+Modi+2002+setalvad+economic failure+tehelka/NDTV/Hindustantimes/CNN IBN"

[seedhi]

Which government – UPA or NDA – has been better for India’s economic and social indicators? Dismiss the rhetoric and stick to the facts. In this analysis, I’ve chosen 10 key parameters. They cover both economic and social criteria. 1.GDP growth: Average GDP growth in 1998-2004 (NDA) was 6% a year. Average annual GDP growth in 2004-13 (UPA), up to June 30, 2013, was 7.9%. Caveat 1: The Vajpayee-led NDA battled US-led economic sanctions following the Pokhran-II nuclear test in May 1998. It faced a short but expensive Kargil war in 1999 and the dotcom bust in 2000. When it took office, it had the lag effect of the East Asian financial crisis of 1997-98 to contend with. Caveat 2: The UPA government, in contrast, benefitted from the economic momentum of the high (8.1%) GDP growth rate of 2003-04 – the NDA government’s final year – and rode that wave. The global liquidity bubble in 2004-08 bouyed foreign inflows, helping UPA-I achieve a high GDP growth rate in its first term. The Lehman Brothers collapse in September 2008 did hurt the Indian economy but the ensuing US Federal Reserve asset buying programme attracted a steady flow of near-zero interest dollars into India from 2009. Despite these caveats, the UPA government’s average annual GDP growth rate of 7.9% in 2004-13 clearly scores over the NDA government’s average annual growth rate of 6% (though high inflation boosted the former significantly). First strike to UPA. 2. Current Account Deficit: 2004: (+) $7.36 billion (surplus). 2013: (-) $80 billion. The winner here is clearly NDA. It ran a current account surplus in 2002, 2003 and 2004. Under UPA this dipped into deficit from 2006 and has spun downwards since. 3. Trade deficit: 2004: (-) $13.16 billion. 2013: (-) $180 billion. Again, advantage NDA. 4. Fiscal deficit: 2004: 4.7% of GDP. 2013: 4.8% of GDP. Not much to choose between the two. Caveat: This extract from the Asian Development Bank Institute (ADBI) report, published in 2010, explains why and when the UPA government’s fiscal defict began to spiral out of control. “The central budget in 2008–2009, announced in February 2008, seemed to continue the progress towards FRBM targets by showing a low fiscal deficit of 2.5% of GDP. However, the 2008–2009 budget quite clearly made inadequate allowances for rural schemes like the farm loan waiver and the expansion of social security schemes under the National Rural Employment Guarantee Act (NREGA), the Sixth Pay Commission award and subsidies for food, fertilizer, and petroleum.†“These together pushed up the fiscal deficit sharply to higher levels. There were also off-budget items like the issue of oil and fertilizer bonds, which should be added to give a true picture of fiscal deficit in 2008–2009. The fiscal deficit shot up to 8.9% of GDP (10.7% including off-budget bonds) against 5.0% in 2007–2008 and the primary surplus turned into a deficit of 3.5% of GDP. “The huge increase in public expenditure in 2008–2009 of 31.2% that followed a 27.4% increase in 2007–2008 was driven by the electoral cycle with parliamentary elections scheduled within a year of the announcement of the budget.†The recent announcement of the Seventh Pay Commission comes again, not unexpectedly, at the end of an electoral cycle. 5. Inflation: 1998-2004: 5%. 2004-2013: 9% (Both figures are averaged out over their respective tenures). Advantage again to NDA. Inflation under NDA was on average half that under UPA, leading to the RBI’s controversial tight money policy, high interest rates and rising EMIs. 6. External Debt: March 2004: $111.6 billion. March 2013: $390 billion. The UPA suffers badly in this comparision, a result of lack of confidence in India’s economy and currency following retrospective tax legislation and other regressive policies, especially during UPA-2. 7. Jobs: 1999-2004: 60 million new jobs created. 2004-11: 14.6 million jobs created. Clearly, the UPA’s big failure has been jobless growth – a bad electoral omen. 8. Rupee: 1998-2004: Variation: Rs. 39 to 49 per $. 2004-13: Variation: Rs. 39 to 68 per $. (Rupee rose from 40-plus to 39 between October 2007 and April 2008.) The NDA government’s economic and fiscal policies, despite the various crises of 1998-2000 pointed out earlier, evoked more global confidence, leading to a relatively stable rupee (Rs. 10 variation) compared to the Rs. 29 variation during UPA’s tenure. 9. HDI: 2004: India was ranked 123rd globally on the human development index (HDI) in 2004, with a score of 0.453. 2013: India has slipped 13 places to 136th globally on the HDI in 2013 with a score of 0.554. 10. Subsidies: 2004: Rs. 44,327 crore. 2013: Rs. 2,31,584 crore. Here again, profligate welfarism, as the ADBI report quoted earlier shows, has led to a rising subsidy bill. Worse, a significant amount is siphoned off by a corrupt nexus of politicians, officials and middlemen. Conclusion: UPA scores above NDA on one of the 10 parameters (GDP growth), is level on one other parameter (fiscal deficit) while NDA does better than UPA on the remaining eight parameters. The next time Finance Minister P. Chidambaram wishes to stage an encounter with facts, he would do well to be aware of those facts. Sources: Economic Survey of India, UNDP, IMF, Planning Commission of India. http://blogs.timesofindia.indiatimes.com/headon/entry/upa-vs-nda-setting-the-economic-record-straight :giggle:

This is on top of the fact that Vajpayee did Pokhran Nuclear tests in 1998 which led to US sanctions which only lifted a few years later. It is noteworthy that in the aftermath of the 1998 test the spineless Manmohan Singh (the then leader of opposition) stood in parliament and said that the sanctions would destroy the Indian economy.

[diga]

This is on top of the fact that Vajpayee did Pokhran Nuclear tests in 1998 which led to US sanctions which only lifted a few years later. It is noteworthy that in the aftermath of the 1998 test the spineless Manmohan Singh (the then leader of opposition) stood in parliament and said that the sanctions would destroy the Indian economy.

Vajpayee :hatsoff:

[coffee_rules]

This is on top of the fact that Vajpayee did Pokhran Nuclear tests in 1998 which led to US sanctions which only lifted a few years later. It is noteworthy that in the aftermath of the 1998 test the spineless Manmohan Singh (the then leader of opposition) stood in parliament and said that the sanctions would destroy the Indian economy.

Hey, don't shoot the messenger.

[Sachin=GOD]

The Hero and the Prince In the democracy they disdain, there should really be no place for either

As this week has once again proved, Manmohan Singh is an easy target. Rahul Gandhi’s attack of the ordinance on convicted politicians drafted by the Manmohan Singh administration was an attempt to reverse the decline of his popularity among the public and within the Congress party. Even as the Prime Minister’s aides were struggling to cope with the fallout, the BJP’s would-be Prime Minister Narendra Modi stood up in Delhi to criticise Manmohan Singh for stammering before US President Obama about India’s poverty. Modi then took it upon himself to declare that Pakistan’s Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif had gravely offended the Indian Republic by comparing Manmohan Singh to a dehati aurat (‘village woman’). Crude and opportunistic, Rahul Gandhi’s attempts backfired. But it did establish that for the sake of protecting his image he was not only willing to stand on either side of an issue within the course of days, but also abandon and insult a man whose loyalty towards him has never wavered. At the same time, Modi’s attack established that he was willing to subvert the truth for the sake of personal aggrandisement. Speaking about poverty alleviation is hardly the same thing as stammering about poverty and even Narendra Modi must realise that Washington DC is the fulcrum for any leverage India may wish to exercise with Pakistan. For both Modi and Gandhi, the position of an Indian Prime Minister representing the country abroad and the possibility of a dialogue between India and Pakistan are minor matters in their quest for furthering their self-image. This is no coincidence. In the cold pursuit of their ambitions, unhampered by any reservations that may stem from personal convictions or the requirements of national policy that go beyond their selves, they are far more similar than they may appear. It is easy enough to mark out the differences between a self-made man and a dynast, a demagogue and a fumbling public speaker, a man who leads from the front and one who is not willing to assume any direct responsibility, but the similarities go even deeper. Both Modi and Gandhi seek to be above and beyond their political parties. For both, the dynamics of power flows only one way, neither of them is answerable to anyone, open to criticism from anyone. Which is why neither is willing to admit a mistake, major or minor, nor willing to submit to questioning from any observer who is not a participant in their personality cults. Both are men so enamoured of their own image that this is the sole reality that constitutes them. It is impossible to discern any conviction or principle that lies at their core beyond their image of themselves. Both have been the subject of two biographies each. It is worthwhile going through these books. There is no shortage of discussion on Brand Modi and Brand Rahul, neither is there any lack of examination of the media management and PR machinery of the two. But there is nothing to reveal what either man stands for or what the principles are that each is unwilling to ever compromise on. In their book on Rahul Gandhi, Jatin Gandhi and Veenu Sandhu cite an interview of Pratap Bhanu Mehta on Rediff.com where he states: “I think Rahul is making the biggest mistake in thinking that… somehow you can be a big national leader without taking a clear public stand on the major issues of the country.” There is a telling moment in Kingshuk Nag’s book The Namo Story: ‘Modi also loves to project himself as a hero, a powerful man, destroying all villains. Any contra-projection angers him. I got a taste of this on the morrow of the Akshardham incident in November 2002. When The Times of India reported how Modi and Advani ventured to enter the complex and pose next to the bodies of the two assailants who had been shot to death, I was greeted by an early morning call from an incensed Modi. ‘Why are you writing that we went in after the intruders were killed? It conveys I am a weak man,’ Modi said.’ It is unsurprising that on the morning after a terrorist incident of this scale, Modi’s real concern was about the impact of the attack on his image. The image of the hero allows for no obstacles, or deities, as LK Advani has recently found and Keshubhai Patel did much earlier. Modi’s path to the top is littered with fallen idols. Even the very organisation that he owes his entire career to, the RSS, stands decimated and marginalised in Gujarat. Unlike in other states such as Madhya Pradesh that have a BJP administration, the Sangh Parivar has no say in the Modi administration and the anger within the VHP against him is explicit. Many of those accused of the 2002 killings in Gujarat feel they have been left to fend for themselves while Modi has accrued to himself the political gains of their actions. Neither is such an image open to scrutiny. This is one of the reasons that Modi has not let an independent lokayukta be appointed in Gujarat. His interviews, much like the ones Sonia Gandhi used to give, seem pre-scripted with little or no space for counter questions. Speaking to The Wall Street Journal on malnutrition earlier this year, Modi said girls in Gujarat suffer malnutrition because it is a vegetarian state where beauty-conscious girls refuse to drink milk when their mothers ask them to. Asked about the Gujarat killings in a Reuters interview, his mind conjured a puppy run over by a car. If this were a simple case of a politician concerned about his self-image, the mistakes could have been acknowledged subsequently and rectified. Politicians such as Bill Clinton have shown that a little humility and contrition go a long way in shoring up a political career. But for Modi, this would mean acknowledging a mistake, and leaders of a cult do not make mistakes, which is why he can claim that China spends 20 per cent of its budget on education and let that statement stand even when it is patently untrue. This is a trait Gandhi shares. It began with his claim that he could have been PM at 25. It continued with his confusion between ashes of the dead and burnt dung heaps in Bhatta Parsaul, where he thought he spotted signs of a massacre of farmers protesting land acquisition. These are statements of his that require an explanation or expression of regret. Again, neither is forthcoming. And exactly as is the case with Modi, this prince cannot be subjected to a sceptical questioner. He has never granted detailed interviews to the media. He has never addressed difficult or uncomfortable questions, or faced such questioners. Aarthi Ramchandran’s book on Rahul Gandhi has a chapter devoted to political opportunism and inaction that begins with the Bhatta Parsaul incident: ‘It was another case of shoot-and-scoot-politics that has become Rahul Gandhi’s hallmark.’ She then deals with the drama played out over the Lokpal Bill where Rahul made a last-minute entry to the debate and claimed his suggestion of Constitutional status for the Lokpal as a ‘game-changer’. It was anything but. However, shoot-and-scoot-politics is a perfect description of how Gandhi acted during his recent intervention on the convicted-politician ordinance, with much the same consequences as in previous cases. It is no surprise that speaking on behalf of the Nationalist Congress Party, a UPA ally, its spokesperson DP Tripathi said, “Mr Rahul Gandhi is free to say whatever he wishes to say about the Congress party, but the Government led by Manmohan Singh is not a Congress government. It is the UPA Government and I am sure Rahul Gandhi knows we are his allies and not his followers.” Tripathi’s reasons for saying so may be a product of cynical self-interest, but they point to something significant. Modi is not the only one who has an ally problem, so does Gandhi, which is why we have never seen him deal with any issue that involves the UPA. Tripathi’s analysis is succinct and to-the-point, for Gandhi is unable to operate in a forum where he is surrounded not by followers but people who will presume to speak as his equals. Again, unsurprisingly, that is a description that applies in equal measure to Modi. This is simply not a case of allies not liking Modi, it goes beyond. In his book on Modi, Nilanjan Mukhopadhyay notes: ‘I asked him about how he looked at the coalition era and the fact that this phase did not appear to be fading away… Modi was unequivocal in his view that ‘by compulsory voting, this problem will get resolved’.’ If we consider these traits collectively, a failure to deal with equals, a discomfort with the diversity of this country, an inability to face sceptical examination or admit mistakes and a disdain for the party structure, we are left with two men who are actually deeply uncomfortable with the workings of a democracy. What we are in effect being offered are two cults, one older and more established, and the other charged with the fervour of neo-converts. This is evident in the manner in which their cult followers react to dissent. I have had several occasions to deal with Manushi Editor Madhu Kishwar’s defence of Modi. It can be greatly amusing to hear of Modi as a man who is implementing Mahatma Gandhi’s ideas, but it is alarming when she asserts that most of Modi’s critics are paid stooges of the Congress. And then in the wake of Gandhi’s theatre on the ordinance, I read the political scientist Radha Kumar’s defence of his actions in The Indian Express, which begins by saying, ‘Led by the BJP, naysayers—which unfortunately includes most of the media …’ Only their belief in their respective cults can excuse such delusion. And like all cults, they feel everyone who stands outside their respective cults is an enemy. This is a clear indication of the dangers that lie ahead if either of these men is a central figure in the next administration. Rahul Gandhi may not be projected as the Congress party’s Prime Ministerial candidate, but given his mother’s failing health, he would be the most powerful figure in any administration where the party plays an important role. To then posit these elections as a choice between ‘communalism’ and ‘corruption’ is not just an oversimplification, it ignores the very real and common dangers posed by either alternative. It is already clear that some of the support that Modi has garnered stems from a dislike of an administration that the Congress has run over the past five years. It is also clear that some of the votes accruing to the Congress and its allies will be a result of a revulsion for Modi. Supporters of the respective cults will read the numbers differently, but even as we face up to the fact that we have never had an election that is so polarising, we must also acknowledge that we have never had an election where such a large number of voters are wary of either of the choices they are presented with. The effect of these voters may not be palpable, some may be forced to make the best of a bad bargain, some may abstain, but their very existence is a sign that despite Modi and Gandhi, there is still some vitality left in this democracy.

http://www.openthemagazine.com/article/voices/the-hero-and-the-prince

[FischerTal]

^ AAP supporter in the making. :agree:

[Sachin=GOD]

^ AAP supporter in the making. :agree:

[Clarke]

7. Jobs: 1999-2004: 60 million new jobs created. 2004-11: 14.6 million jobs created. Clearly, the UPA’s big failure has been jobless growth – a bad electoral omen.

I am simply unable to grasp this; what is the truth in this set of numbers ? If these are true, what exactly is there to compare between the two parties ? One side can help provide record numbers of livelihoods in one term and gets thrashed while the other throws handouts at election time and claims poori roti khayenge etc after ruling the country for more than five decades ?

[ravishingravi]

I am simply unable to grasp this; what is the truth in this set of numbers ? If these are true, what exactly is there to compare between the two parties ? One side can help provide record numbers of livelihoods in one term and gets thrashed while the other throws handouts at election time and claims poori roti khayenge etc after ruling the country for more than five decades ?

Numbers seem exaggerated. But I m sure the infrastructure work done during NDA is unparalleled in India's history. Sent from my iPhone using Tapatalk - now Free

[adi B]

^rightly pointed

[Sachin=GOD]

2014 Lok Sabha elections process may begin in mid-March, hints CEC V S Sampath The next general elections will be held in multiple phases next year and be completed in time to constitute the 16th Lok Sabha by June 1, Chief Election Commissioner V S Sampath has said. "National elections may be held in five, six or seven phases," Sampath said at an event at the Brookings Institute, an American think-tank, hosted in association with the US India Business Council and Confederation of Indian Industry. He said the Election Commission (EC) had already started preparations for the 2014 elections in which 780 million people are likely to cast their vote at over 800,000 polling booths, using over 1.18 million electronic voting machines. Without giving any details of the poll schedule, Sampath hinted that the election process could begin in mid-March and said the 16th general elections will elect 543 members. "Indian elections never missed the deadline, even in most trying circumstances," he said on Friday. "Preparation is on." "Tenure of the present Lok Sabha comes to an end on May 31. So the next House has to be before June 1. It is our responsibility to conduct the election before that date," he said, adding that the number of phases has yet to be decided. He said the notification for the election would be issued three weeks before the first date of the poll and announcement of the election comes another three weeks in advance. "So six weeks before the actual first day of the poll, the Election Commission would make the announcement of the election," he said, adding that the model code of conduct would come into force on the day the announcement is made. "Summary Revision of electoral roll 2014 is in progress and India will have a new electoral roll published within a month," he said, adding the EC will continue its efforts to enroll any missing people and weed out wrong ones till close to the polls. "Our close review of election preparedness in each part of the country will begin soon. Will cover law and order, logistics, condition of polling stations, resources, men and material and equipment," he said. This would mean, he said, mobilisation of millions of temporary staff, supervisors and police forces and their planned deployment; putting in place sound mechanism to deal with possible threats like muscle power, money power and power of incumbency; creation of specific enforcement modules and imparting of time-bound training and scientific and comprehensive voter education and awareness measures to make the largest possible citizen participation. http://www.indianexpress.com/news/2014-lok-sabha-elections-process-may-begin-in-midmarch-hints-cec-v-s-sampath/1207618/0

[ganeshran]

This is on top of the fact that Vajpayee did Pokhran Nuclear tests in 1998 which led to US sanctions which only lifted a few years later. It is noteworthy that in the aftermath of the 1998 test the spineless Manmohan Singh (the then leader of opposition) stood in parliament and said that the sanctions would destroy the Indian economy.

Most of the work for the nuclear program was done under PV Narasimha Rao, but the weapon was not ready back then till it was too late. Gujral was the PM who took a strict stand against the bomb and Vajpayee then gave the go ahead in 1998

[ganeshran]

http://blogs.timesofindia.indiatimes.com/headon/entry/upa-vs-nda-setting-the-economic-record-straight :giggle:

What is the original source behind these job numbers. Such a drastic difference needs more detailed looking over